Friday, 24 July 2015

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 (also known as. "land for peace" resolution)

Resolution 242 (1967)
of 22 November 1967


The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting



Follow up:


http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf 
Page 1
Chapter
THE 1967 AND 1973 WARS
Security Council adopts resolution 242 (1967).
With the question of Palestine unresolved, an uneasy peace, punc-
tuated by violence and acts of force, was maintained in the region
from 1950 until 1967, when Israel came to occupy the entire area of
the former British Mandate of Palestine.
Establishment of UNEF I
Earlier, armed conflict had erupted in 1956, when, on 29
October, Israel began military operations against Egypt, joined
later by France and the United Kingdom. In a politically
charged atmosphere, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July
of that year. The crisis ended with a ceasefire called for by the
General Assembly at an emergency special session, the eventual
withdrawal of the invading forces and the deployment of the
  

With the question of Palestine unresolved, an uneasy peace, punc-
tuated by violence and acts of force, was maintained in the region
from 1950 until 1967, when Israel came to occupy the entire area of
the former British Mandate of Palestine.
Establishment of UNEF I
Earlier, armed conflict had erupted in 1956, when, on 29
October, Israel began military operations against Egypt, joined
later by France and the United Kingdom. In a politically
charged atmosphere, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July
of that year. The crisis ended with a ceasefire called for by the
General Assembly at an emergency special session, the eventual
withdrawal of the invading forces and the deployment of the
 

This is the html version of the file http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf.
Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.
Page 1
Chapter
THE 1967 AND 1973 WARS
Security Council adopts resolution 242 (1967).
With the question of Palestine unresolved, an uneasy peace, punc-
tuated by violence and acts of force, was maintained in the region
from 1950 until 1967, when Israel came to occupy the entire area of
the former British Mandate of Palestine.
Establishment of UNEF I
Earlier, armed conflict had erupted in 1956, when, on 29
October, Israel began military operations against Egypt, joined
later by France and the United Kingdom. In a politically
charged atmosphere, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July
of that year. The crisis ended with a ceasefire called for by the
General Assembly at an emergency special session, the eventual
withdrawal of the invading forces and the deployment of the
17
3
rial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
The resolution also affirmed the territorial inviolability of
every State in the region and called for “achieving a just settle-
ment of the refugee problem”.
Egypt and Jordan accepted resolution 242 (1967) and con-
sidered Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the
1967 war as a precondition to negotiations. Israel, which also
accepted the resolution, stated that the questions of withdrawal
and refugees could be settled only through direct negotiations
with the Arab States and the conclusion of a comprehensive
peace treaty. Syria rejected the Council action, maintaining
that the resolution had linked the central issue of Israeli with-
drawal to concessions demanded from Arab countries. The
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) strongly criticized the
resolution, which it said reduced the question of Palestine to a
refugee problem.
War of 1973 and Security Council resolution 338 (1973)
In October 1973, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel
in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic on the Golan Heights. As fighting
reached a critical stage, the Soviet Union and the United States
jointly requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. On
22 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 338
(1973), which reaffirmed the principles of resolution 242 and
called for negotiations aimed at “a just and durable peace in the
Middle East”. The ceasefire call was later confirmed in resolu-
tion 339 (1973) of 23 October, and the Secretary-General was
requested to dispatch United Nations observers immediately.
However, as fighting continued in the region, President
Anwar el Sadat of Egypt appealed directly to the Soviet Union
and the United States to intervene with troops and enforce the
ceasefire. While the Soviet Union agreed, the United States
19
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)—the first United
Nations peacekeeping force.
UNEF I was withdrawn in May 1967 at the request of Egypt,
which had informed the Secretary-General that it would no
longer consent to the stationing of the force on Egyptian terri-
tory and in Gaza. On 5 June 1967, hostilities broke out between
Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria. By the time a ceasefire called
for by the Security Council was accepted by the parties, Israel
had occupied the Egyptian Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank
including East Jerusalem and part of the Syrian Golan Heights.
After the ceasefire was secured, the Security Council adopted
resolution 237 (1967), in which it called upon Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the
return of the displaced persons. The Governments concerned
were asked to respect scrupulously the humanitarian principles
governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war con-
tained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, of 1949. At its fifth
emergency special session, convened after the fighting began,
the General Assembly called upon Governments and interna-
tional organizations to extend emergency humanitarian assist-
ance to those affected by the war. The Assembly asked Israel to
rescind all measures already taken and to desist from taking fur-
ther action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.
Security Council resolution 242 (1967)
Later that year, on 22 November, the Security Council unani-
mously adopted, after much negotiation, resolution 242 (1967),
laying down principles for a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East. The resolution stipulated that the establishment of a just
and lasting peace should include the application of two principles:
Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied
in the recent conflict; and
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territo-
8
2
0
opposed the request, putting the two super Powers on a collision
course. At the request of Egypt, the Security Council recon-
vened on 24 October, where a resolution calling for the creation
of a new peacekeeping force, which became the second United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), was worked out. After
Egypt and Israel agreed to disengage their forces, UNEF II super-
vised their redeployment. Under a separate agreement reached
in May 1974, Israel and Syria signed a disengagement agree-
ment. This led to the establishment of the United Nations
Disengagement Force (UNDOF), which was assigned to moni-
tor the agreements between Israel and Syria. The Council
renewed UNEF’s mandate periodically until July 1979, when it
was allowed to lapse following the conclusion of a peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel. UNDOF continues to function on the
Golan Heights.
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through meas-
u res including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Repre-
sentative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to pro-
mote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and
principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council on the pro g ress of the eff o rts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.
2) Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973
The Security Council,
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing
and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than
12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in
the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after
the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolu-
tion 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-
fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned
under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.
Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none.1
1
One member (China) did not participate in the voting.
23
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338
Security Council resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967,
and resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973, are considered
basic instruments in all subsequent discussions of a Middle East
peace settlement.
1) Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of
22 November 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of
the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commit-
ment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1 . Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles re q u i res the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following
p r i n c i p l e s :
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occu-
pied in the recent conflict;
(i i) Te rmination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovere i g n t y, terr i-
torial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of forc e;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through inter-
national waterways in the area;
2
UN facts

Security Council adopts resolution 242 (1967).

With the question of Palestine unresolved, an uneasy peace, punc-
tuated by violence and acts of force, was maintained in the region
from 1950 until 1967, when Israel came to occupy the entire area of
the former British Mandate of Palestine.
Establishment of UNEF I
Earlier, armed conflict had erupted in 1956, when, on 29
October, Israel began military operations against Egypt, joined
later by France and the United Kingdom. In a politically
charged atmosphere, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July
of that year. The crisis ended with a ceasefire called for by the
General Assembly at an emergency special session, the eventual
withdrawal of the invading forces and the deployment of the
17
3

rial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
The resolution also affirmed the territorial inviolability of
every State in the region and called for “achieving a just settle-
ment of the refugee problem”.
Egypt and Jordan accepted resolution 242 (1967) and con-
sidered Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the
1967 war as a precondition to negotiations. Israel, which also
accepted the resolution, stated that the questions of withdrawal
and refugees could be settled only through direct negotiations
with the Arab States and the conclusion of a comprehensive
peace treaty. Syria rejected the Council action, maintaining
that the resolution had linked the central issue of Israeli with-
drawal to concessions demanded from Arab countries. The
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) strongly criticized the
resolution, which it said reduced the question of Palestine to a
refugee problem.
War of 1973 and Security Council resolution 338 (1973)
In October 1973, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel
in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israel and the
Syrian Arab Republic on the Golan Heights. As fighting
reached a critical stage, the Soviet Union and the United States
jointly requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. On
22 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 338
(1973), which reaffirmed the principles of resolution 242 and
called for negotiations aimed at “a just and durable peace in the
Middle East”. The ceasefire call was later confirmed in resolu-
tion 339 (1973) of 23 October, and the Secretary-General was
requested to dispatch United Nations observers immediately.
However, as fighting continued in the region, President
Anwar el Sadat of Egypt appealed directly to the Soviet Union
and the United States to intervene with troops and enforce the
ceasefire. While the Soviet Union agreed, the United States
19
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)—the first United
Nations peacekeeping force.
UNEF I was withdrawn in May 1967 at the request of Egypt,
which had informed the Secretary-General that it would no
longer consent to the stationing of the force on Egyptian terri-
tory and in Gaza. On 5 June 1967, hostilities broke out between
Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria. By the time a ceasefire called
for by the Security Council was accepted by the parties, Israel
had occupied the Egyptian Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank
including East Jerusalem and part of the Syrian Golan Heights.
After the ceasefire was secured, the Security Council adopted
resolution 237 (1967), in which it called upon Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the
return of the displaced persons. The Governments concerned
were asked to respect scrupulously the humanitarian principles
governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war con-
tained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, of 1949. At its fifth
emergency special session, convened after the fighting began,
the General Assembly called upon Governments and interna-
tional organizations to extend emergency humanitarian assist-
ance to those affected by the war. The Assembly asked Israel to
rescind all measures already taken and to desist from taking fur-
ther action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.
Security Council resolution 242 (1967)
Later that year, on 22 November, the Security Council unani-
mously adopted, after much negotiation, resolution 242 (1967),
laying down principles for a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East. The resolution stipulated that the establishment of a just
and lasting peace should include the application of two principles:
Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied
in the recent conflict; and
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territo-

Thursday, 23 July 2015

How Jewish and Palestinian cultural artifacts became Israeli property by Haokets


A new book looks at the ways in which ancient religious manuscripts belonging to Yemenite Jews, as well as thousands of books owned by Palestinians and Holocaust survivors became part of Israel’s National Library in Jerusalem.

By Gish Amit (Translated by Shaked Spier)
The reading room in Israel's National Library in Jerusalem. (photo: Assaf Pinchuk/CC BY 3.0)
The reading room in Israel’s National Library in Jerusalem. (photo: Assaf Pinchuk/CC BY 3.0)
The book “Ex Libris: History of Robbery, Preservation, and Appropriation in the National Library in Jerusalem,” addresses three affairs that took place within the walls of the Israeli National Library in Jerusalem: the robbery of Yemenite Jews’ manuscripts, which migrated to Israel during the 1940’s and 50’s; the collection of many thousands of book owned by Palestinians, which became part of the library’s collection; and the political struggles surrounding the redistribution of books belonging to Holocaust victims after World War II.
I argue that these three events are deeply intertwined in the way they reveal the manner by which Zionism has separated between people and their culture and heritage as part of the formation of national identity. The book’s epilogue, which is published here, aspires to think about the relationship between literature and socio-political violence. By doing so, it paints a new portrait of the National Library: not a site of secluded history, which is permanently decided and determined, but rather a continuous present tangled up with its own past — a space of injustice that also enables processes such as reparation, recognition and forgiveness.
+          +          +
Mary Douglas wrote that objects are always encoded signs of social meanings. As a site of power creation and identity formation, the National Library of Israel in Jerusalem isn’t a place of knowledge, which is chosen in a naïve manner and free from hidden agenda, but rather a plac, in which knowledge is created, organized and sorted along the lines of ethnic, class, and national categories; a space that transforms objects into an inseparable part of a social reality that provides them with value according to its standards and needs. The three affairs described in the book “Ex Libris” couldn’t have happened unless Zionism had portrayed itself as the voice of the secret wishes of individuals and their communities, under the ethos of denial of (Jewish) exile; unless individuals had been transformed into objects serving a nation in its constituting phase, a nation that has left its mark on individuals and communities while claiming to speak in their name and redeem their culture, while at the same time giving objects human, national, and social value.
These affairs are a testimony to the modern Jewish settlement in Palestine/Israel, along with the Hebrew culture that developed alongside it, are first and foremost a chapter in modern European history. In all three affairs, intellectuals and bureaucrats whom acted out of a commitment — complex as it was — to the Zionist project had taken the right of representation from those who could not speak up or were denied of representation in history. These three affairs were articulated and described in terms of rescue and salvation, and those who took part in them truly believed in the nobility of their cause. In all three affairs the National Library has acted as a shelter to histories, which were deliberately forgotten.
The colonial imagination played a central role in these affairs: the collection of Palestinian and Yemenite-Jewish manuscripts and books was based on an Orientalist perspective that holds that only he can speak (from a paternalistic position) in the name of the indigenous communities that he studies; he was influenced by a long history of colonial bureaucracy that used census, ethnographic research, cartography and the deciphering of indigenous culture to sort individuals; and he is led by the view according to which the European colonies will help the natives achieve a “civilized way of life.” However, the “Diaspora Treasures” project grew out of orientalism (among other things) as a centuries-old European — partly anti-Semitic discourse — as well as the wish of the intellectuals in Jerusalem to extricate themselves from being the object of orientalism. In order to finally be European, they had to leave Europe.
Yemenite Jews walking to a ‘reception camp’ near Aden, 1949. (Photo by Kluger Zoltan/Israel National Archive)
Yemenite Jews walking to a ‘reception camp’ near Aden, 1949. (Photo by Kluger Zoltan/Israel National Archive)
Nevertheless, the National Library isn’t a place of sealed history, but rather of a continuous present that is tangled up in its own past: vast research works in the past two decades have deconstructed the archive’s innocent image as the carrier of the past and its memory, uncovering its role in the creation of legislation and social order — in the regulation of the political relationship between memory and forgetfulness. According to Jacques Derrida, the word archive comes from the Greek word Arkhe, which combines two principles: a natural or historical one — physical, historical or ontological — as well as the principle of law; there were people and gods who ruled, there was authority, social orders were practiced by which order was set.
Procedures of collection, politics of storage, and policies of cataloging became the alpha and omega of anthropologists, historians, and sociologists, which — as Michel de Certeau invited them to do — searched for new locales in historical research, while redefining both the kind of knowledge that has created the archive as well as their own position in relation to it. The archive, the argument goes, isn’t documenting historical experience but first and foremost its absence, while constantly reminding us that the thing we have lost was never in our possession to begin with. It isn’t a source of concluded knowledge or the objective messenger of history, but rather it is subjective and divided; a place that documents injustice and enables us to investigate it; a place in which authority, knowledge, and domination are the other side of that collection of documents and certificates that paves the way to forgotten histories and can, one day, convict their owners.
Like the symptom — a formation of the unknown, a compromise between two opposite desires and “a truth taking form” — the material structure of the archive reveals what the tongue doesn’t always explicitly articulate. Therefore, it also bears the potential to pave the way for processes of coping, recognition, and reparation.
What relevance has, for example, the fact that the gathering of cultural and spiritual objects from Europe was accurately documented — that culminated in an archive within the National Library’s archive — while documents and certificates that relate to the other two affairs were (deliberately, it seems) arbitrarily scattered, and, in the case of the Yemenite Jews, even disappeared? What significance does it have that only the Palestinian books can be found in the library’s storerooms (since they were marked and grouped together), while the books and manuscripts of European, and to a certain extent Yemenite Jews, were dispersed among the holdings of the the Library’s without a trace?
Read: Yemenite Children Affair — Families of the kidnapped speak out
I believe that procedures of documentation, indexing, and storing enable us to investigate the events while at the same time ponder not only the similarities, but also the differences between the three affairs. They reveal foundations of embarrassment and doubt; they keep the actions, hopes, believes, embarrassments and decisions of the individuals that built and formed the archive under lock and key. They may tell us more thea the documents themselves can, while at the same time undermining the archive’s image as the absolute expression of sovereign power. Furthermore, these procedures indicate the quality and quasi-futuristic nature of the past, its open and undecided nature, and offer a new comprehension of the library as a vulnerable fragile space that carries the memory of disaster, that preserves the traces of disaster and its remains. It is not a site of secluded history, which is permanently decided and determined, but rather a site that subverts the concept of past and gives the past lively, unsealed dimensions; a space that isn’t a past, but rather, in Derrida’s words: “an answer, promise, and responsibility toward the future.”
+          +          +
The “Diaspora Treasures” project was based, first and foremost, on a deep personal commitment. For the Hebrew University’s employees, the efforts to deposit the books and manuscripts in the hands of the National Library in Jerusalem were inseparable from the Jewish struggle for collective recognition as the sole proprietors of the cultural possessions that were robbed by the Nazis in the absence of a Jewish nation-state. Therefore, they served as the crucial means for the rescue of Jewish culture after the Holocaust. Hayyim Nahman Bialik’s words, as he articulated the Hebrew University’s task in face of National Socialism in 1934, echo in their actions:
“[…] And for such times we have one way here: to concentrate our lives, to rescue the surviving remnant, to rescue those who escape destruction, give them another chance to connect the Jewish brain, the Jewish experience, the Jewish instinct, and the Jewish feeling to concrete creations […] The Hebrew University should accept this role. That is, it has to set an example of the idea of the concentration and gathering in its field, but also to serve as a mentor for the entire nation […] Of all the ups and downs of our lives, now we can hear the voice of history that tells us: gather now! And woe unto those, who will not listen to this voice and will seek salvation in a new diaspora! […]”
The “Diaspora Treasures” project was an act of rescue and an antidote to the Nazi’s efforts to bring Jewish culture in Europe to extinction. However, the collection of the books in Jerusalem contains contradicting, dialectic elements: it was a testimony to the existence and prosperity of Jewish culture in diaspora, while at the same time a monument for its destruction; it was a counterweight to the Zionist movement’s tendency to deny the diasporic Jewish past, while at the same time constituted a part of the Zionist demand for exclusive ownership over the Jewish past; it was meant to remind us of victims who were violently separated from their culture, while at the same time taking part in the nationalization of the Holocaust by the State of Israel.
The other two affairs discussed in “Ex Libris” — the collection of entire Palestinian libraries during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the collection of the cultural and spiritual assets belonging to Yeminite Jews) were described by their perpetrators in terms of grace and salvation. The former was done under the assumption that the collection of cultural assets in circumstances of war and chaos will save them from loss; the latter followed the doctrine that viewed the return of Yemenite Jews to their homeland as both a physical and spiritual salvation — a salvation that threatened their cultural and spiritual assets with extinction, and therefore required they be placed in the hands of national institutions. In both cases, the concepts of rescue and salvation were not without entirely baseless, since the collection of cultural assets apparently prevented their loss and allowed a broad audience to access to them.
"Palestinian-owned books at Israel's National Library, marked 'AP' for 'abandoned property. (Screenshot from 'The Great Book Robbery')
“Palestinian-owned books at Israel’s National Library, marked ‘AP’ for ‘abandoned property. (Screenshot from ‘The Great Book Robbery’)
Nevertheless in both cases the practices of collection and appropriation were based on Eurocentric and orientalist views — both Palestinians and Yemenite Jews were viewed as unable to fully grasp the value and significance of their own cultural assets. Another important difference between the “Diaspora Treasures” project and the collection of Palestinian and Yemenite Jews’ cultural assets is the presence, even if banished and denied,of the assets’ rightful owners. The fact that for over 60 years no effort was made to return the Palestinian books to their rightful owners or legal successors; the continuous denial of the injustices perpetrated against Yemenite Jews; the refusal to become accustomed to individuals’ right to posses the cultural assets that they themselves created and owned; and the fact that in both cases the books were not remnants of the past, but rather part of the contemporary life — all these, in their refusal to confront what happened, turn these two affairs into acts of injustice.
The three affairs were also part of a continuous process of constructing and adopting an imaginary identity — one that is bound to contradictory processes of the internalization and rejection of Christian orientalist discourse. As other scholars have noted, Jews were almost always present when Westerners spoke of “the East” and reacted to the anti-Semitic orientalism in three major ways: rejecting themselves as being the objects of orientalism; idealization and romanticization of the Orient and of themselves as its representatives; as well as the image of traditional and ultra-Orthodox Jews as “oriental” in contrast to their own self-representation as “Western.”
Each of the affairs was meant to establish the identity of Jerusalem intellectuals as Western, while helping them escape the embarrassment they experienced as a result of the images of the European Christianity and Orientalism. The embarrassment, however, refused to fade away. The longing for Europe has both made clear and reinforced the distance from Europe, while turning Westernization is a self-defeating, Sisyphean task. In other words, all three affairs not only grew out of the proximity between Zionism, the West and Western Colonialism, but also out of the passion to lend the Hebrew University a Western image, thus presenting its leaders as part of the European Enlightenment project.
The roots and motives behind the events do not lie in a stable, Western identity, but rather in its absence and the efforts to establish such an identity. They are not the outcome, but rather the cause and reason, and they are tied to the manner in which the white powers construct the meaning of “blackness,” which then creates the meaning behind whiteness. They are an inseparable part of the “white material” that colonial nationalism should continue to grapple with, in the hopeless attempt to wash its hands clean.
This article was first published in Hebrew on Haokets.