Tuesday, 26 July 2016

Straits in WA - a narrow passage of water connecting two seas or two other large areas of water.

Strait of Hormuz - Iran 












Strait of Tiran between Gulf of Aqaba and Red Sea
Strait tiran 83.jpg

Suez Canal - Egypt




Bosphorus (red) and Dardanelles 
Turkish_Strait - Map showing the location of the Dardanelles (yellow) relative to the Bosphorus (red). Also depicted are the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean Sea, and the Black Sea.











Bab-el-Mandeb 


Map of Bab-el-Mandeb.png


The Mytilini Strait is a strait in the Aegean Sea that separates the Greek island of Lesbos from Turkey.




Map of the Middle East
Map of the Middle East (W123/CC BY 3.0)

Sunday, 17 January 2016

Kashmir Pandits

BRAHMAN KASHMIRI PANDITS VS GUJARAT MUSLIMS 2002

1) 219 Brahman Kashmiri Pandits killed in Kashmir in 22 years of violence*.
Vs
2000 Muslims killed in 3 days of violence in Gujarat in 2002. Which is genocide?

2) 58,697 Brahman Kashmiri Pandit familes left valley and provided with free food, reservation in state and central government offices, schools and colleges, all over India*.
Vs
5 lakhs Muslims living in refugee camps have to live on streets and Modi closed their camps.

3) Rs. 1,61,8,00,00,000 (Rs. 1618 crores) of money pumped in for rehabilitation of Brahman Kashmiri Pandit familes*.
Vs
Rs. 500 for each house of a Gujarati Muslim burnt by khakhi chaddi terrorists in Gujarat 2002.

4) Kashmiri Pandits Government servants occupying expensive Government accommodation in south Delhi without rent for 20 years#.
Vs
Muslims in Gujarat don't get homes to rent or to buy even if they want to pay a premium!

5) 'The J&K Migrants Immovable Property (Preservation, Protection and Restrain of Distress Sales) Act 1997' and 'J&K Migrants (Stay of Proceedings) Act, 1997' to protect and restrain the distress sale of properties left behind in the Valley by the migrants*.
Vs
Gujarati Muslims forced to sell their properties and live in a few ghettos of Ahmedabad.

6) In 1990s one member of each Brahman Kashmiri Pandit who has ran away from Kashmir valley got a Government job in Central Government owned units like HMT. They are now enjoying tax payers' money as pension after retirement.
Vs
None of the Gujarati Muslims affected in the 2002 genocide got a single job

7) Most of the state governments since 1990s reserved seats in professional colleges for Brahman Kashmiri Pandits.
Vs
Gujarati Muslims were discriminated in schools after 2002 genocide.

8) BRAHMAN KASHMIRI PANDITS DO NOT PAY TAXES LIKE OTHER INDIANS THANKS TO AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED DURING THE REIGN OF MMS? Don't believe? Read it on this webpage of Lok Sabha, Government of India.
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx?dbsl=5776
Vs
Gujarati Muslims who work hard like every one and pay their taxes to the nation.

* Statement by Minister of State for Home, Government of India, Jitendra Singh in Lok Sabha in Aug 2011 and on December 13, 2011 (Press Trust Of India, New Delhi)
# Times of India  01 Dec 2010

DO YOU KNOW THAT BRAHMAN KASHMIRI PANDITS DO NOT PAY TAXES LIKE OTHER INDIANS THANKS TO AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED DURING THE REIGN OF MMS? Don't believe? Read it on this webpage of Lok Sabha, Government of India.
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/Result13.aspx?dbsl=5776

Thursday, 27 August 2015

bibliography



Hussein Al-Rimmawi, “Spatial Changes in Palestine: from Colonial Project to an
Apartheid System,” African and Asian Studies, Volume 8, Number 4, November 2009,
pp. 375-412. 
 Paul McCann, “The Role of UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees,” Palestine-Israel
Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, Volume 15, Number 4, 2008, pp. 83-89.
Kjell-Åke Nordquist, “Contradicting Peace Proposals in the Palestine Conflict,” Journal
of Peace Research, Volume 22, Number 2, June 1985, pp. 159-173
 Gordon A. Babst and Nicole M. Tellier, “One State or Two in Israel/Palestine: The Stress
on Gender and Citizenship,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Volume 34, Issue 2, March 2012,
pp. 70-91.
 Adnan Enshassi, “Construction Projects and the Environment in Palestine,” Building
Research & Information, Volume 25, Number 2, 1997, pp. 111-114
 Victoria Brittain, “A Palestine That Might Have Been,” Race & Class, Volume 53,
Number 3, January-March 2012, pp. 99-105
 Issam Al-Khatib, Sana' Kamal, Basem Taha, Jamil Al Hamad, and Hatem Jaber, “Water
– Health Relationships in Developing Countries: A Case Study in Tulkarem District in
Palestine,” International Journal of Environmental Health Research, Volume 13,
Number 2, June 2003, pp. 199-206.
Parsons, Nigel. The Politics ofthe Palestinian Authority. From Oslo to Al-Aqsa. London: Routledge, 2005

oslo failure

it might be said in hindsight that Oslo ultimately failed because while its fashioners set in motion a process that could potentially lead to trust and confidence, they did not establish mechanisms for monitoring violations or ensuring that claims of violations could be arbitrated and corrections could be guaranteed. Without such safeguards, the dynamic of the Oslo process fell prey to longstanding sentiments of mistrust and anger between Palestinians and Israelis.

The key flaw of the Oslo process lay in the philosophical conceit that the most intractable differences could simply be deferred to the end of the process while the implementation of interim agreements would build the mutual trust and confidence to be able to tackle the tougher issues. It didn't work that way. By the time the Camp David talks were held to negotiate final status issues, there was less mutual trust and confidence than when the accords were signed.
The key lesson to be drawn is that interim agreements can't be the focus; even if it can't be implemented now, any new process has to forge agreement on the end state. Palestinians don't trust the interim approach because they don't trust that the final-status issues will ever be tackled.

Oslo failed because there was no accountability, because some parts of the international community took it as an end in itself. Israel continued to be treated as a state above the law, allowing it to enjoy the benefits of the peace process (more international legitimacy, open markets) while consolidating its settlement enterprise in Palestine. It is just about the international community respecting its own laws and commitments. If initiatives such as the E.U. guidelines on settlements and the U.N. recognition of the state of Palestine had been taken before, the situation now would be different.
Oslo had some important elements, such as a clear time frame (five years) and Israel's acceptance that the endgame was application of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which does not recognize the acquisition of land through the use of force. Israel also had to commit to discuss as final-status issues subjects that they never accepted to discuss before, such as Jerusalem and refugees. It even had to deliver a letter assuring that Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem as well as Christian and Muslim holy shrines would be preserved during the interim period, just as it committed to free all pre-Oslo prisoners and not take any action on the ground that could predetermine the result of negotiations -- namely settlement construction. Israel abused that, implementing the parts of Oslo that it liked and not implementing the things it did not like. The Palestinians, meanwhile, were expected to abide by the entire agreement. It was an imbalanced process.
But none of this worked because of the lack of accountability.
Accountability is needed. We don't need a peace process, especially if it is interim. What is needed are decisions. Our internationally recognized right to self-determination is not up to negotiations, and Israel must decide whether it accepts that or not. The role of the international community should be to redress the balance of power in order to have a meaningful solution rather than keep the disparity by continue granting Israel impunity.
 it did not freeze settlement activity. It envisaged a two-state solution but did not stop the main killer of that possibility, which is the steady expansion of Israeli settlements  in the occupied territories. There were 150,000 Israeli settlers in the territories when the agreement was signed; today there are 600,000.
The main lesson is that the peace process was used as political cover for a process that was the opposite of peace. And the same mistake is being repeated now. Israel is again using peace talks to provide cover for ongoing settlement expansion and the consolidation of an unjust, discriminatory apartheid system.
One of the first reasons it failed is that, from a structural point of view, there's nothing in there to prevent Israeli settlement construction, and that, I think, was the most fatal flaw of the Oslo process -- that Israel never committed not to increasing settlements. And during the five years, the Palestinians expected a withdrawal from all the occupied territories except for military bases, settlement blocs in East Jerusalem. What happened was we got this area A, B and C relationship that continues to this day, long after it was due to expire in 1998. And first doubling of settlers in that period and now well over a half a million.
The other thing is that the basis of the Oslo agreement was the letters of initial recognition: On the one hand, the PLO, representing the Palestinian people legitimately, recognized that the state of Israel it should live in peace and security. The Israelis in return recognized merely the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, but Israel did not recognize and to this day has not recognized either the Palestinian state or the Palestinian right to statehood. So there's a deep asymmetry there, in which you could say the Palestinians played their single biggest card -- recognition of Israel -- in expectation of receiving something reciprocal in the future once the legality has been agreed on. But here we are, 20 years later without that and with more and more senior Israeli politicians dismissing the idea of that.
 One thing is that we certainly need a third party (and that would have to be the United States because there isn't an alternative) that can hold the parties accountable to what they have agreed to. That is essential. I really think that a process with an asymmetry of power, like the one that exists between Israel and the Palestinians, requires a third-party guarantor that enforces accountability.
You cannot have a negotiation in which one side is handicapped in what can be discussed, in which one side is not allowed to put issues on the table and in which the mediator is biased in favor of the more powerful party. And all of those were the conditions under which Oslo was negotiated.

The Palestinians were forced by the Americans and the Israelis to negotiate interim agreements and not deal with any of the important issues between them and Israel. The United States laid down the ground rules and was the supposed intermediary while always coordinating every one of its positions with the Israelis. Those are conditions that guarantee that you're not going to have a resolution, when the Israelis are not really willing to consider ending the occupation (which they were not and are not), ending settlements (which they were not and are not) and giving the Palestinians full and complete self-determination and independence.
Oslo failed because we didn't do enough to rein in the peace-destroying mechanisms. The Palestinians had conceded the majority of their homeland; in exchange they expected an end to the erosion and creeping annexation of the little that remains. But the Israelis didn't stop the occupation and the colonial-settlement enterprise for one moment

The Oslo accords were not meant to live forever. They were temporary scaffolding to support a transition from occupation and control to partnership between equals -- but the fundamental imbalance of power meant the parties never negotiated as equals.
It's time to explore new paradigms that will save us from further humiliation and arrogance, occupation and violence. We have reached a dead end in which there is no freedom for the Palestinian nation. We have grown no closer to a just and viable solution of two states for two peoples. We all live under one discriminatory Israeli regime. And many of us lost hope in finding a just solution.
The fates of both nations are inextricably tied together, and the individual rights and equality of all those who live between the Jordan River and the sea, as well as their communal rights, must be recognized. Exclusive privileges for Israeli Jews in land ownership and access to natural resources must be canceled, and the Palestinian refugees' right of return must be recognized, even if implementing that right must be done on the basis of justice on present realities, avoiding the creation of new injustices.

The Israelis went into Oslo wanting to remove the stain of being an occupier. They wanted to enter into negotiations because it would improve their economy, and they really got tired of having, one generation after another, Israelis being the ones ruling over the Palestinians. At a certain point, one generation after another begins to question the legitimacy and the necessity of maintaining rule over another people. So for the Israelis, Oslo really worked. They managed to get 45 countries to sign diplomatic relations with them just from the period of 1993 onward. They got a peace treaty with the Jordanians in 1994. That wouldn't have been possible if it had not been for the Palestinians. They got money from Europeans and from the Americans to pay for the Palestinians -- money that they themselves would've had to pay. Basically, they removed the stain of being an occupier, plus they got the ability to build and expand their settlements. From the period of 1993 to 2000, the settler population almost doubled in size.
For the Palestinians, it was just a series of promises -- a promise that there was going to be a process, a promise that there was going to be freedom, a promise that things were going to get better, but none of that really came to issue because nobody was really focused on the Palestinians. Everyone was so desperate to get Israel to sign on to anything that all international efforts went into appeasing the Israelis.
If people had wanted it to succeed, the international community, in particular the United States, wouldn't have been pushing the Palestinians to negotiate their rights. They would've, instead, been pressuring Israel to end its military rule. They could have held Israel to account for all its violations -- for the ongoing settlement construction, for the fact that it didn't release the prisoners, for putting restrictions on movement, for everything it could’ve been held accountable for -- but they didn't, so the conclusion for me is that Oslo failed because it was designed to fail.
The first lesson we should learn is that Palestinians should not have had to negotiate their freedom; rather, the international community should have held Israel accountable. The Palestinians -- or any people who are denied their freedoms -- shouldn't have to negotiate their rights and shouldn't negotiate with their oppressor. The pressure should be coming from the international community on the ones doing the oppressing, not on the oppressed.
The second is that without that kind of sustained pressure on Israel, Israel will do whatever it wants to do, and we've already seen it just in the start of these new negotiations at the end of July. The Israelis have announced 1,500 new housing units in East Jerusalem alone, marking one of the highest rates of settlement growth in Jerusalem since before Oslo.
The major lesson to be learned is that there is a huge power imbalance between Israelis and Palestinians. And pretending there is no power imbalance is simply not going to work. This is what the Americans would love for people to believe. They'd love for people to believe that it's just a question of two sides and the two sides' sitting down together and negotiating and meeting and if the venue is good enough, then they're just going to work it out. But what they don't realize is that there is a huge power imbalance between the two sides. Rather than the United States supporting and backing Israel, what it should do instead is recognize this power imbalance and make sure that the powerful party -- i.e., Israel -- be held to account rather than make demands that the weak party -- the Palestinian party, the powerless party -- continue to give in more, to make more and more compromises.
1. It is important to highlight that the Oslo process did not include large portions of the Palestinian people and in particular the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the millions of Palestinian refugees living in forced exile.
Israel has since its beginnings worked on dividing and fragmenting the Palestinian people in various categories and subcategories. The main categories are the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Palestinians living in occupied Palestinian territory (West Bank–, Gaza Strip– and East Jerusalem–ID holders) and the Palestinian refugees (registered as well as nonregistered) who are living in forced exile.
The Oslo process, which was initiated by Israel, has institutionalized this fragmentation by creating a Palestinian institution, the Palestinian National Authority, which by definition represents only the Palestinian population living in the West Bank and Gaza.
Oslo failed simply because Israel has continued its colonial practices of forcibly displacing the Palestinian people. This deliberate displacement of Palestinians by Israel from 1948 until the present amounts to a policy and practice of forcible transfer of the Palestinian population -- ethnic cleansing. This process is ongoing -- ongoing Nakba -- and has resulted so far in 70% of the Palestinian population worldwide belonging to the group of refugees or internally displaced persons.
Through the years, a number of stumbling blocks to the peace process have been discussed, such as the steady expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the building of the extensive "separation wall". A glimmer of hope was experienced when Israel disengaged from all settlements in Gaza in September 2005. Israel stated that the occupation of Gaza had come to an end, even though Gaza is left as the world's largest open-air prison, upon which the siege was enforced after the Palestinian elections in 2006 saw Hamas returned to power.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide has recently pointed to the separation wall as an obstacle to Palestinian economic development.
Our point of departure is the internationally agreed-upon position that Israel is responsible for an illegal occupation of Palestine; the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Israel officially states that it has not been occupying but rather administering a territory since 1967 that was not controlled by any other state. This position was clearly denounced by the International Court of Justice in its 2004 advisory statement on the "separation wall" surrounding the West Bank.
Twenty years later
An assessment of the accords can be made, based on the historical and political context in which the accords were born, focusing on framing conditions and limitations that could have serious repercussions for the possibility of the accords succeeding. It can also be made by focusing on the actual results that have come out of the accords for the people concerned. Lack of security comes high on the list, for both.
For the Palestinians, lack of economic prosperity and lack of freedom of movement ranks high, as do power cuts, scarcity of water, lack of proper medical treatment and medicines, as well as difficulties in education. Thousands are in prison for resisting occupation. Palestinian security forces are seen as defenders of Israeli security rather than of Palestinian security. Democracy has lost its true meaning here. More seriously, the Oslo Accords are seen by many as the most devastating treason against Palestinian national aspirations. Instead of leading to a sovereign and independent Palestinian state, which has been the aspiration of most Palestinians and important international players, it laid the foundations for a continuation of the occupation - with a Palestinian face. Instead of strengthening the unity of the Palestinians, the Oslo Accords resulted in severe divisions undermining a unified struggle for freedom.
Among Palestinians, the belief was that national independence and a sovereign state would be the outcome.
Within Israeli political circles, no unified vision was present, apart from managing the occupation in the best possible way. Historical evidence indicates that the Israeli leadership has never been ready to grant the Palestinians a sovereign state. Continued negotiations between two parties so uneven in military, economic and political strength, can in our view never succeed. The international community, with the US and the EU at the head, must take responsibility for the progress and implementation of the accords, paying due respect to the Palestinians' just demands for a sovereign state within the 1967 borders.

The mutual acceptance between Israel and the PLO in 1993 was unequal. Without a mutual acceptance of each other's right to live as free people in two sovereign and equal states, no two state-solution is possible. Israeli security concerns should never be more prominent than Palestinian security concerns. The international community should not request the two unequal partners to reach a solution to a problem created through the UN in 1947. Just to dust off the Oslo Accords will not do.
There is still hope for a better future among the Palestinians and the Israelis, even if disillusion is spreading. A mutual acceptance of each other's right to exist and prosper without labelling is needed. When the parliament in Iceland in 2011 endorsed the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign and independent state within the 1967 borders, it sent a signal to the international community to act, denouncing the occupation and approving the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The Oslo Accords so far have not achieved that. Forty-six years of occupation should be far too long for the international community and for human security and dignity.
















Tuesday, 25 August 2015

First, the PLO accepted the Israeli demand to recognise the State of Israel decades ago and Israel never reciprocated with recognition of the State of Palestine or its right to exist. Now, while still denying self-determination to Palestinians, Israel demands recognition "as a Jewish state" not from the world but from Palestinians alone. Israel does not want to formally change its name to "the Jewish State of Israel"
The ostensibly pragmatic land-for-peace approach is one that says the parties will never agree on a historical narrative and must look to the future instead. But the Jewish state demand undercuts this and demands Palestinians accept the Israeli narrative that securing Jewish majoritarianism in Palestine was morally justified even if it necessitated destroying Palestinian society and created masses of Palestinian refugees. Asking Palestinians to make a deal that focuses on the future is one thing, but asking them to accept the crimes committed against them is another altogether. It is unbecoming of a party that claims to want a just peace.
As the Israeli historian Benny Morris said, "A Jewish state would not have come into being without the uprooting of 700,000 Palestinians. Therefore, it was necessary to uproot them. There was no choice but to expel that population." Legitimising the pursuit of Jewish majoritarianism ad infinitum opens the door to future actions like this.
 Making matters worse is that while Washington accepts new Israeli demands, it also fails to enforce Israeli obligations. The Road Map, which called for a settlement freeze, was never enforced. This allows Israel to have its cake, eat it, and then demand even more cake.
The truth is, the main reason Netanyahu makes this demand is that he knows the Palestinians cannot accept it for all of the above reasons. Yet, he makes it, knowing it will be met with sympathy in Washington and put the Palestinians in the position of looking like rejectionists. This way, he aims to put a stop to any negotiations that would lead to an end to Israeli occupation.
After several days of the Israel attack, self-servingly code-named "Protective Edge" by Israel, US President Barack Obama has offered to mediate a return to the 2012 ceasefire that had been arranged through the good offices of Egypt after the earlier onslaught on Gaza.

Whether the US government, the undisguised patron and unconditional supporter of Israel, has the credibility to play such a mediating role is rather doubtful.

An aspect of the distorted approach to responsibility for the violence in Gaza is the refusal of the West to take note of the connection between Protective Edge and the June 12 kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli settler teenage children and the surge of revenge violence, which culminated in the grisly murder of 17-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir.

Hysterical reaction

Without ever disclosing evidence linking Hamas to such an atrocious crime, the Netanyahu government and Israeli media reacted hysterically, immediately inciting a vicious campaign against Hamas throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, including air strikes in Gaza and provocatively calling upon the Israeli citizenry to strike back at the Palestinians. In this inflamed atmosphere, the Israeli government undertook a massive campaign of collective punishment, itself a war crime: hundreds of Palestinians thought to be associated with Hamas were arrested and detained; house demolitions of the homes of suspects; killings of six Palestinians; lockdown of entire cities; air strikes against Gaza.

All this was done despite the mounting belief of independent observers that the crime against the Israeli youths was carried out by two Palestinians unaffiliated with Hamas, perhaps with an initial plan to bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners in an exchange. Never has it been asserted in high profile diplomatic circles of the West that the horrible crime provided Netanyahu with a pretext for an anti-Hamas campaign, which seems less motivated by a response to the kidnapping/murder than by the political objective of punishing the Palestinian leadership for defying the Netanyahu government for recently achieving a measure of reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Further in the background is the Israeli interest in shifting responsibility away from themselves for the failure of the Kerry negotiations that collapsed at the end of April.
Israel's leaders have responded defiantly, suggesting that Protective Edge will not cease until the Hamas infrastructure is destroyed, supposedly to ensure that no rockets will ever again be fired from Gaza. When Palestinian civilians are killed in the process of pursuing such an elusive goal, this is rationalised by Israeli officials as a regrettable side effect of what Israeli leaders are claiming to be a legitimate military undertaking. In a characteristic warped statement, Netanyahu declared: "We are not eager for battle, but the security of our citizens and children takes precedence over all else."
An appropriate further response would be for the UN General Assembly to recommend an arms embargo imposed on Israel. This would be a largely symbolic gesture as Israel has become a major weapons maker, exporting arms to many countries with a sales pitch stressing the benefits of "field-tested" weaponry.
It is time to acknowledge that these talks were carried on in bad faith: while the diplomats sat around the table, Israeli settlements relentlessly expanded, apartheid structures deepened their hold on the West Bank and Jerusalem, and Gaza was cordoned off as a hostage enclave to be attacked by Israel at will and a bloody sacrifice exacted.

At least, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nabil al-Araby, condemned the "dangerous Israeli escalation", urged the Security Council to "adopt measures to stop Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip", and warned of the humanitarian consequences. Turkey and Iran issued official statements along similar lines.

There is so much regional turbulence at present that it is unlikely to hope for anything more than scattered verbal denunciations from authorities in the region preoccupied with other concerns, but given the gravity of the situation, attention needs to be refocused on the Palestinian ordeal.

Pressure on Israel is urgently needed to protect the Palestinian people from further tragedy.
November 2 marked the 97th anniversary of the infamous Balfour Declaration, a letter written in 1917 by Britain's then-Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a leader of the Zionist movement. In the letter, Balfour said the government viewed "with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", and would use its "best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object".

The effect of this declaration was best summed up by the late British author and journalist Arthur Koestler: "One nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third."

It had no moral or legal right to do so.

The declaration contradicted Britain's previous promise of "complete and final liberation" for the Arabs if they rose up against their Ottoman rulers. Their subsequent revolt was pivotal to the weakening of the Ottoman empire, and thereby the outcome of World War I.

Balfour reneged on his own pledge in his letter to Rothschild that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".
In 1919, he wrote in a memorandum: "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country... Zionism be it right or wrong is more important than the wishes of 700,000 Arabs," who constituted some 94 percent of the population of Palestine at the time.

Israel's creation

The Balfour Declaration, and its implementation by the British mandate in Palestine from 1920, culminated in Israel's creation in 1948, and the wholesale dispossession of the Palestinian people. As such, every anniversary of the declaration should be used to highlight Britain's central responsibility for the Palestinians' plight, and its continued refusal to right a monumental wrong.

Labour MP Grahame Morris, who sponsored the recent legislation urging the government to recognise Palestine as a state, reminded MPs of this responsibility during the parliamentary debate. "A sacred trust ... to guide Palestinians to statehood and independence ... has been neglected for far too long," he said.

MPs overwhelmingly agreed, with 274 supporting the motion and only 12 opposing it. Prime Minister David Cameron's response to this non-binding resolution was shameful, with his spokesman insisting that the government's position "won't be changing".

Cameron is not just defying the clear will of parliament, but also the British public. Opinion polls over the years have shown that far more Brits sympathise with the Palestinians than with Israel - two and half times as many, according to a YouGov poll in August. Sympathy for the Palestinians "can be seen across party lines", said YouGov. In July, a poll on behalf of the Sunday Times showed twice as many Brits siding with the Palestinians than with Israel.

London's belligerence is also increasingly out of step with world opinion. It abstained during the UN General Assembly vote that chose overwhelmingly (138-9) to upgrade Palestine's status from "observer entity" to "non-member observer state". Almost three-quarters of UN member states voted in favour, including most of the European Union.

The upgraded status allows the Palestinians to join the International Criminal Court. This is vehemently opposed by Britain despite being one of the founding members of the ICC, and despite its stated commitment to increasing the Court's membership to eventual universal jurisdiction. A Foreign Office strategy paper last year said this "will increase accountability and help challenge impunity", which is "a fundamental element of our foreign policy".

Learnt from history?

Before rejecting Palestinian accession to the ICC, Foreign Secretary William Hague had said just a few months prior: "We have learnt from history that you cannot have lasting peace without justice, accountability and reconciliation," and that "institutions of international justice are not foreign policy tools to be switched on and off at will".
This is a blatant double standard that has global implications. "Such clear inconsistency from one of the ICC's strongest supporters is a gift to enemies of the court and of international justice around the world," wrote Clive Baldwin, senior legal adviser at Human Rights Watch.

British governments cannot indefinitely swim against the domestic and international tides. Of the three main political parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats support recognition of a Palestinian state. Labour leader Ed Miliband, who said he wants to be Britain's first Jewish prime minister, supported the parliamentary motion and urged his party's MPs to do the same.

There is growing dissent even among the traditionally pro-Israel Conservative party. Dozens of its MPs voted in favour of recognising Palestine, and a growing number of important party figures are speaking out against Israel's policies.

They include former International Development Secretary Alan Duncan, Richard Ottaway (chairman of the powerful Foreign Affairs Select Committee), and former Defence Secretary Nicholas Soames. Baroness Warsi resigned as Foreign Office minister in August over the government's "morally indefensible" stance vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

All this suggests that a future British government could recognise Palestine, and with elections due next year, that possibility might not be far off.

Middle East Minister Tobias Ellwood is right to state that "only an end to the occupation will ensure that Palestinian statehood becomes a reality on the ground". It is high time that Britain atone for the original sin of the Balfour Declaration by contributing seriously to ending that occupation, rather than aiding and abetting the occupier militarily, politically, and economically.
The first Israeli massacre in Gaza occurred in 1956. My father was a small boy at the time, but he remembers how the men were rounded up and shot. Today, his grand-nephews and -nieces, also refugees, also born in camps, cower in terror as the third generation of Ashkenazis in Palestine shows them their place. Life in the shadows, balanced precariously on obsidian with fire on either side - that's their inheritance.
Among Israeli elites, Gaza is everything to everyone. Israeli politicians attack Gaza to enhance their electoral appeal. They use it to muzzle the opposition, to preserve a coalition or to distract from a domestic scandal. Israeli generals like to invade to provide troops with "battle" training or to test new wares, and to debut new formations and tactics; Hamas is not Hezbollah, after all.
Jewish-Israeli scientists, meanwhile, coordinate with the army to use the territory as a convenient testing ground for advanced, experimental technologies. Corporate Israel later repackages those technologies for global export. Those are the relationships - the status quo.

The recent move towards Palestinian reconciliation undertaken by the Hamas and PLO leaderships, threatened to end the political - if not material - isolation of Gaza. It posed a risk to the current state of things by providing Hamas, a political movement which came to power through elections, with a means for re-entering the realm of international legitimacy.
Jewish-Israeli scientists, meanwhile, coordinate with the army to use the territory as a convenient testing ground for advanced, experimental technologies. Corporate Israel later repackages those technologies for global export. Those are the relationships - the status quo.

The recent move towards Palestinian reconciliation undertaken by the Hamas and PLO leaderships, threatened to end the political - if not material - isolation of Gaza. It posed a risk to the current state of things by providing Hamas, a political movement which came to power through elections, with a means for re-entering the realm of international legitimacy.
More than a month after the reconciliation, it appears that Netanyahu has succeeded - his balance has been restored. Israelis are free to indulge in a grand delusion of self-righteousness. "No normal country could tolerate terrorists firing missiles into its urban centres," they say. 

"No normal country practises the crime of apartheid."

"No normal country demolishes the homes of suspects…

or punishes millions of people…

or seeks vengeance and vengeance and vengeance in a fit of bloody wrath," we might wearily reply.












Saturday, 8 August 2015

Those judging a policy such as invading and occupying Iraq should take for granted that some assumptions will be erroneous, some policies will be mistaken, and some outcomes will be unplanned. If the strategy cannot survive the unexpected, its flaws run far deeper. Such an intervention—seeking to transform another society from outside, despite significant differences in history, religion, culture, tradition, ethnicity, interest, and more—inevitably creates a large risk of failure. And such an action almost inevitably will replace one set of problems with another set of equal if not greater magnitude.
Indeed, our experience in the Middle East highlights how one intervention almost always begets another and another. The 1953 coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh elevated the Shah to full power. His authoritarian misrule led to his ouster in 1979. The triumph of Islamic radicals in Tehran caused Washington to back Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s aggressive war against Iran. In 1990 Hussein acted as the U.S. had feared the Iranians would act, expanding in the Gulf, leading to the first Gulf War and a force deployment in Saudi Arabia, which Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz later acknowledged to be one of Osama bin Laden’s grievances.
America’s interest varies dramatically based on the character of potential adversary groups such as ISIL. The world is filled with forces representing various degrees of antagonism and hostility toward the U.S., but most have little occasion to act on those sentiments. They may lack the desire, opportunity, or means to strike, or fear the consequences of doing so. The latter—deterrence—kept the most horrid dictatorships of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s in check for decades.
Although ISIL’s character is not immutable, so far it acts more like a party in a traditional civil war than a terrorist group. In fact, the organization even offers social services and religious education more characteristic of a traditional government.
U.S. military action almost certainly would result in more costs than benefits. Into this violent and unpredictable imbroglio President Obama is sending some Special Forces and contemplating “targeted, precise military action,” presumably air and drone strikes. Some observers have called for confronting not just ISIL, but also the Baghdad government to force it to broaden its support and demobilize Shiite militias, and Tehran, to limit the latter’s influence and compel the withdrawal of any military units.
Unfortunately, Washington already has learned the limits of military power, especially when imposed from afar with little popular support for long-term occupation in pursuit of what amounts to international social engineering. The more the U.S. attempts to do, the less likely it will do it well. Iraq’s most serious problem today is that the state lacks credibility and will, and the military lacks leadership and commitment. These America cannot provide.
America loses by giving a blank check to Baghdad or attempting to transform Baghdad. Next to ISIL’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the man most responsible for the ongoing debacle is Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The latter has misgoverned, exacerbated sectarian tensions, and weakened his nation’s governing institutions. To support his government is to reward his counterproductive behavior and encourage continuation of a strategy which has brought his country to near ruin. The tighter the U.S. embrace, the less likely he will either reform his government or reach beyond his narrow Shia base of support.
Backing the Syrian resistance against Bashar al-Assad’s government risks further undermining the Iraqi government and ultimately American interests. The civil war in Syria obviously is a humanitarian tragedy, but it long has been well beyond Washington’s control. The claim that if only the U.S. had given the right measure of support to the right group at the right time a democratic government representing all Syrians would have emerged is dubious: little about American involvement in the Middle East suggests the necessary combination of perspicacity, nuance, competence, and humility.In any case, the conflict has moved well beyond any such moment.The Damascus government is odious, but not as obviously inimical to U.S. interests as an ISIL “caliphate” reaching across Iraq and Syria. Further weakening the Assad regime increases the opening for ISIL and other jihadist forces. While aiding more moderate fighters might help them regain lost ground against radical forces, experience suggest doing so is more likely to create a new source of materiel resupply for ISIL—if the latter continues to triumph in clashes between the two.





Friday, 7 August 2015

nationalism

From negative, stereotypical portrayals of Palestinians in textbooks - if they are mentioned at all - and maps that don't illustrate Israel's correct borders, to strict censorship over what Palestinian citizens of Israel are allowed to teach and learn, Peled-Elhanan explained that virtually all subjects in the Israeli curriculum are imbued with some form of extreme nationalism.
"It's going back to what's characterised in the research as the education of the 1950s: a very blunt, nationalistic, non-scientific presentation of the world, of us, and of the political situation of the place," Peled-Elhanan said.

"The purpose is to educate children to be good soldiers. You cannot be a good soldier if you do not have this image of an enemy which is a bit blurred, and you don't know much about the people except that they are 'problems' and 'threats'."