About this course
This course will discuss the emergence of the modern Middle East from the fall of the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War to the present. It will discuss the Ottoman legacy in the region and the Western imperial impact on the creation of the Arab state system. The course will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context.
Lecture transcript
In 1839, the sultan, Abdul Majid succeeded Mahmud II. This is the beginning of a period known in Ottoman history as the Tanzimat. The reorganization, or the reforms of the empire, was from now on that reforms were engaged in officially guided by official policy statements, and this went on for decades. The goals of the Tanzimat, the reforms. Were set out in two reforming edicts. The one, the first, was called the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane, issued in 1839. That is the Noble Edict of the Rose Garden of the Sultan's Palace, as the edict is known. And the second edict proclaiming more or less the same reforms but in greater detail, was issued in 1856 and is known as the Hatt-i Humayun, the Imperial Edict. One should add to these, the Ottoman constitution of 1876. If the reforms were meant to create a more liberal form of government, they failed. The Ottoman Empire as a result of the reforms did not become a more liberal or democratic entity. But if they were designed to strengthen the central government. And prolong the life of the Empire, they succeeded. And the Empire lasted for another 80 more years. And no small achievement. The first priority with these reforms, as in the previous reforms, was the army. Between one-half and two-thirds of all expenditure on the reforms went to the building of various military forces. And money to pay for the army required a change in the method of taxation. The method of taxation was therefore modernized and change form the old form of tax farming. Tax farming known as Iltizam, in Turkish, was a way in which notables were given the right to collect taxes from the citizenry. And in most cases, they pocketed much or most of the taxes for themselves, and this became a very corrupt and ineffective system. There was a need for wide-scale administrative reform, in order to carry out the reforms of the empire. This led to the development of a modern system of education to supply a much needed skilled manpower for the army and the administration. This was a classic example of modernization led by the needs of military reform. Administrative reform was the necessary partner for any reform of the army. One had to remodel the system of provincial government. And this was done by the passing of a new administrative provincial law, the Vilayet Law of 1864, which established a much more centralized government, run from Istanbul. Which allowed for a more effective collection of taxation, and a more effective administration of the government from the center to the provinces. There was a need to tie the provinces more directly to the center. And this was indeed achieved to at least a certain degree as a result of the Tanzimat. The Vilayets, the provinces, were placed under a governor and a structured system of subdistricts under the governor. And all of these run by appointees from Istanbul. Local councils were also created in the various parts of the provinces. And in these local councils, there were some appointed officials, some elected members, and these operated alongside the governors in a form of representation of local opinion, along with a greater measure of government centralization. In 1847, the Ministry of Education was established. This, of course, removed education from the control of the religious establishment where it had been until then. Therefore weakening evermore, the status and the stature of the Ullman in the Ottoman Empire. The established of the Ministry of Education and the creation of these new schools was in recognition of the need for the acquisition of skills for this world. For the advancement of the empire in this world, and the recognition of religion was valuable much more for the next world than it was for this one. And there was, of course, a need to keep up with the advances that were taking place not only in Europe. But in the Christian schools inside the Ottoman empire itself. Now during the Tanzimat, one must confess that education was not entirely revolutionized. It was much more difficult to change schools and education, in the villages, then it was in the towns and the cities. But what was true, was that the Tanzimat did succeed in creating a number of excellent high schools that were created in the main cities of Turkey. And were indeed established to reduce the bureaucrats who would carry on with the reform until the very end of the empire. Reforms in administration in the military eventually, of course, led to reform in the legal system. And indeed the reforms in the legal system were the most revolutionary of all. Why were the reforms in the legal system the most revolutionary? Because in the legal system meant undermining religious law. It meant undermining the weight and the status of the Sharia, it meant changing collective identity. There was nothing that weakened the hold of Islam on society more than the reform of law. And perhaps the most important legal reform of all. Was the decision to grant all subjects of the empire equality before the law. This was not the case until the Tanzimat. Religious minorities, like Jews and Christians, enjoyed religious autonomy in the empire. But they were not equal before the law. Islam was a superior civilization and a superior legal system in the eyes of the believers. Equality before the law essentially meant that Muslims, Jews, and Christians were now all equal before the law, which could no longer be the Sharia. Just by granting equality before the law, one had to erode one of the very basic principles of the Sharia, which preferred Muslims to the Jews and the Christians and other minorities. Equality before the law was a revolutionary change in the sense that now, as opposed to the past when law applied to different communities, the Muslims had their law and the Christians and the Jews were governed by their own legal authorities. Equality before the law meant that the same law applied to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. That is what we can call the territorialization of the legal system. For the first time ever, there is one legal system. That applies to all subjects of the empire. No longer communities enjoying their particular legal orders, but individuals equal before the law. For all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was a great step towards territorial nationalism. Because if the law applies territorially, to all subjects of the empire and not communities as communities. This is a great step towards the territorialization of identity. Territorial nationalism. This required new laws, obviously, that would grant equality to all. It required the training of lawyers and judges to apply the law. The Edict of 1839, in which this equality before the law was proclaimed, was explained and justified as a need to correct the deviation from the Sharia of the last 150 years. And the argument that countries who do not follow the Sharia cannot survive. So, in fact, this erosion of the Sharia, was explained and justified as if it were an upholding of the Sharia. Which in fact, of course it was not. This deviation from the Sharia of the last 150 years that had to be corrected according to the edict of the Sultan had to be fixed by new legislation. But what is new legislation? New legislation is an indication that the Sharia is no longer sufficient. That it is new legislation that must be taken from other bodies, external bodies of law. The 1839 edict introduced principles such as the security of life and property. The abolition of tax farming, the organized and proper enlistment to the army, and of course, justice and equality for all subjects, regardless of their religion. This is a radical deviation from the Sharia. And why new legislation? New legislation obviously because the Sharia is no longer sufficient. God's law was not good enough. This is the secularization of law taken from European sources. And again, a most serious blow to the religious establishment and their authority.
Lecture transcript
The guaranteeing to equality to the minorities was meant to preserve their loyalty to the empire. But in fact, the opposite was achieved. Equality for the minorities was intended to offer the Christians of the empire who were gradually breaking away as we have seen with the uprising of the Greeks in the 1820s. It was to offer the Christians equal participation within the empire as Ottoman subjects, but the Christians drew a totally different conclusion. If equality, then equality as states of their own outside the empire. And it only accelerated the Christian desire to break away, which most of them indeed did. For the Muslims, this idea of equality of all before the law was a cause for considerable opposition and frustration. This was an incorporation of the practices of the infidels, an undermining of the sharia of the religious law. And not all Muslim subjects of the empire could accept that without complaint. The major outburst came in Damascus in 1860, where there was massacre of 1000 of Christians. In a protest against the Tanzimat. Yeah, against the new reforms. Interesting in this Eventi Damascus was that the Jews of Damascus were not affected by the outbreak of violence, it was not against the Jews who the Muslims had a complaint. Their complaint was against increasing Christian influence. The increase of the influence of Christian powers. The increase of the influence of Christians and their schools. The Jews of the empire did not represent foreign powers. There were no external Jewish powers that threatened the empire. And as a result, the Jews were not seen as partner's to external influence and power. On the contrary, the Jews were seen for what they really were loyal Ottoman subjects. The Christians in the empire had the desire to break away wherever this was territorially feasible and as we will see it wasn't territorially feasible everywhere. But in places where it was like in the Balkans, this was the preferred direction that Christian minorities took. And what was difficult for the empire in this circumstance was that it was no longer possible to suppress the Christians who sought to break away, because of European pressure. And as the British historian, points out, it was a contradiction here. The state was becoming more powerful and more centralized as a result of the reforms, but it's ability to use these new advantages was limited by increasing external influence. One can see this increasing external influence by the timing of the edicts of reform as they were issued. And they were issued at various times when the need to leave an impression of liberalism on Europe was important for the empire. One should not make the mistake, however, by concluding that the reforms were just window dressing for the, for the Europeans. They were not. These were genuine desires for reform from within the Ottoman Empire, out of recognition that the empire had to be reformed and strengthened. But there was at the same time, a need for European assistance. In 1839 the reforms were introduced at a time when the Ottoman Empire desperately needed help against Muhammad Ali, who was threatening Istanbul. In 1856 the reforms were issued at the end of the Crimean War where again, the Ottomans were in need of European support against Russian designs against them. In 1876, the constitution was passed in an effort to avoid European intervention as the empire was going bankrupt. It was at that time also in the mid-1870s that the financial problems of the empire were compounded by the possible intervention of Europeans in their struggles with the Christians in the Balkans. But the constitution was passed in 1876, also for real domestic reasons. There was a movement at that time known as the Young Ottomans. The most well-known spokesperson of which was Namik Kemal. And Namik Kemal had made an argument, noting that the Tanzimat reforms had removed the elements, which had traditionally restrained the strength of the Sultan of the government. The religious establishment, the Ulama and the Janissaries. And the Namil Kemal was right. Those forces that had previously restrained the Sultan were no longer there. So in order to exercise to some form of influence over the Sultan and in order to keep the momentum of reform going when the Sultans in power were elected to do so. There was a need for greater influence on the Sultan through the vehicle of Shura, the Islamic injunction for consultation. This was a justification for the creation of a parliament and for the passing of a constitution. These ideas of constitutionalism and parliament were part of a broader movement to which we will refer to later in greater detail of Islamic reform. That movement which spoke of the need for a synthesis between the West and Western ideas and Islamic values in order to avoid the loss of Islamic identity in the process of westernizing reforms. Reform in the empire was obviously essential, but so was the preservation of the empire's Islamic character. If the empire was reformed, but wouldn't be Islamic. Who needed it? So there had to be this synthesis between the reform and the maintenance of the Islamic character of the empire and this was emphasized further by the troubles of the 1870s. The empire was bankrupted by the expense of the reforms and the loss of Christian territories in the Balkans. And as a result, the migration of Muslims from there into the empire. The empire was becoming more Muslim and less Christian. After the 1876-78 war with the Serbs and the Bulgarians that led to further Christian gains and to another war with Russia and Ottoman defeat, there were more vocal critics of reform and resentment for the concessions that would be made. So, it seemed to Christians and to Christian powers. The new sultan, Abdulhamid II, dissolved the newly formed parliament in 1878. The Constitution remained in place, but wasn't acted upon. And Pan-Islamism became a feature that the Sultan emphasized as a common front of Muslim peoples against the European-Christian empires. Muslim solidarity at this phase was still much easier to mobilize amongst the masses than more secular notions of nationalism. If the Tanzimat was considered a process of liberalization than this suspension of the Constitution in 1878, marks the failure of that movement. But it wasn't really a process of liberalization, it was a bureaucratic and not a liberal movement. The reforms were not just lip service to Europe. They were genuine reforms of government and the military, which serve the purposes of the empire and its long term survival. And with all its shortcomings and all its limitations, the Tanzimat, nevertheless, laid the foundations of modern Turkey. As Bernard Lewis puts it, the biggest achievement of the Tanzimat was in the field of education. A new group of educated elite emerged out of the new schools, but at the same time, there was also widespread hostility towards the reforms as some kind of foreign intrusion or foreign invention. But in reality, there was only one option and that was to move forwards towards more reform and more change. And for Turkey, there was no turning back.
No comments:
Post a Comment