Middle East And North Africa Modernity, Tradition and the Age of Reform

Traditional World View and Opposition to Reform (part 2)

Ottoman empire.

The period to begin the age of reform, in the Ottoman empire, is with Sultan Selim

III, who reigned from 1789 to 1807. This was a period of accelerated reform. It's

interesting to note that Selim the Third came to power in the same year of the

French revolution. During the last quarter of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire's

decline was becoming evermore obvious. And on the other hand, in Europe we see the

French Revolution and then the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. The huge power of Europe

expressing itself against the background of increasing Ottoman decline. Before this

period, there had still been the belief in the Ottoman Empire of the inherent superiority of Islam, and that minor adoptions of reform in the domain of the

military and methods of war, would suffice. But by the time we come to the end of the

18th century, it is very clear that this would not be enough. [BLANK_AUDIO] In 1783,

the Ottomans lost Crimea to the Russians. It was great historical importance to this defeat. It was the first surrender, of Muslim populated territory, to a Christian

power. The loss of Muslim territory eroded the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire as an

Islamic Empire. After all the legitimacy of the empire was grounded in its

protection, of the Muslim peoples. This loss of the Crimea, this loss of Muslim

populated territory to a Christian power, was an indication that the Ottoman system

had comprehensively failed.

What had to be overcome in order to engage in reform was the traditional world view

that included a considerable opposition to the very idea of reform. As Bernard Lewis

has noted, in the Islamic state and community, it was believed that they were the

sole repositories of enlightenment and truth, surrounded by an outer darkness of

barbarism and unbelief. There was nothing to learn from the outside world. And

therefore, there was a great difficulty to make the transition into a world where this

was no longer true. Where the Islamic state was no longer the sole repository of

enlightenment and truth. And one depended on learning from the Christian world and

becoming more dependent on the goodwill of Christian powers. There were two main

opponents to reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the Ulama, that is the religious

establishment, the men of religion and the Janissaries. The Janissaries were the

elite, military force of the Ottoman Empire. Both of these were extremely opposed to

any idea of reform. The opposition of the religious establishment, the Ulama, was

based on opposition in principle, to any innovation, particularly to the adoption of

infidel practices, which is what reform actually meant. The Janissary, called the

one time elite Ottoman infantry, had lost much of their equality and had become

extremely corrupt. A word or two about the Janissaries and their gradual corruptions.

The origins of the Janissaries, yeniçeri in Turkish, which means new soldier. The

Janissaries were originally Christian boys, abducted from their families, to be raised

as Muslims, elite soldiers and loyal servants of the sultan. But with time, positions

in the force were inherited or sold to non-professionals. And the Janissaries

gradually declined with time and became an ineffective and weak military force, and

they turned eventually into a troublesome group at the disposal of the enemies of

reform. Selim III, in his reform program, employed many foreign advisers. Many of

them were French. He also established permanent embassies in Western Europe, and

people who served in these embassies in the west became the people who were the

architects of the future, of reform in the later years of the Ottoman Empire. The

focus of reform as we have mentioned, was on the military, and this is a factor of

great importance not only then, but all the way through even to the modern time.

Military offices in the Middle East, as a result of their being at the center of the

process of reform, military officers have become the standard bearers of

modernization and secularism. And therefore, we will see military officers throughout

the history of the Middle East of the last 200 years. At the focus of revolutionary

movements and of clashes between the forces of modernity and the forces of tradition.

The most important reform of Selim III in the field of the military, is the

establishment of a new core of troops known as Nizam-i Jedid. This was established in

1791, and the ranks of the Nizam-i Jedid were filled by conscription, European style,

following the example of European conscript armies. In 1805, the Janissaries

obviously opposed to this kind of competition, revolted against the general

conscription and defeated the new troops. Other auxiliary troops of the Ottoman army

rebelled in 1807 because they were required to wear European style uniforms. It is

particularly interesting to note that just the change of uniforms was enough to

arouse rebellion because this touched on a very sensitive issue of collective

identity. It wasn't just changing the clothing. The problem of European-style uniforms meant abandoning the external appearance distinguishing between Muslims and

infidels. For Muslims, it was important to distinguish their external appearance from

those who were not Muslims. There is an Islamic tradition requiring believers to

distinguish yourselves from the infidels. Their mutiny of these auxiliary troops was

supported by both the Janissaries and the Ulama, the religious establishment. And

both of these, the Janissaries and the Ulama, had either ideological reasons, or

interests of self-interest to oppose the reforms. For the Ulama, this was both a

question of ideology and self-interest. After all, reforms meant eroding the place of

the men of religion in the state. For the Janissaries, this was mainly an issue of

self-interest, creating military forces that would turn them within time to a

superfluous, out-of-date military order. But it is their opposition that led to the

overthrow of the reforming Sultan Selim III. He was deposed in 1807, and the main

reason for his failure, at this time, to continue the pace of reform, was that the

opponents of reform simply outnumbered those who supported it. The fact that the

reforms were carried out with foreign advice, made it much easier to discredit them

as infidel innovations.

Traditional World View and Opposition to Reform (part 2)

What was required to continue the pace of reform was to remove the Janissaries as a

force of consequence. And the sultan Mahmud II, in 1826, did exactly that. He

abolished the Janissary Corps. Mahmud II, who ruled from 1808 to 1839, is often

described as the Ottoman version of the Russian Peter the Great, in terms of his

contribution to the modernizing and reforming of the Ottoman Empire. In the Greek

revolt of the 1820s, that we referred to in our previous lesson, the Janissaries, as

a military force, revealed their total incompetence. Mahmud II renewed his attempt at

forming a new army in 1826. This time however, he was careful in formulating the

reforms within an Islamic framework, in order to forestall accusations of infidel

innovations. This time, there were Muslim instructors and a fatwa, a religious

ruling, was issued to the effect that the reforms were in line with the Sharia, with

Islamic law. However, the Janissaries, as Mahmud had expected, revolted again against

the reforms. But the Sultan was not surprised, and he was now ready to crash the

Janissaries, and he did so with great force. The Janissaries no longer enjoyed

popular support as protectors of the faith. They were seen now for what they really were, an unruly, self-interested rabble. Thousands of Janissaries were killed in the

uprising, and the Janissary Corps was finally abolished. Ottoman historians refer

to this as The Auspicious Event, and in terms of reform and modernization, indeed it

was. The road to creation of a European style army, and for comprehensive reforms, was

now wide open. The Ulama, the men of religion, the religious establishment, and

provincial notables who enjoyed a great deal of political power, gradually suffered a

reduction in their power and influence, as the result of the strengthening of state

power in the advent of reform. European style reforms and assistance from European

advisors were now openly carried out. New schools were established, mainly to support

the military reforms. A medical school for Army doctors. A school of military

sciences. And it's important to note that the language of instruction in these

schools was French. The exposure to foreign languages doesn't only mean the exposure

to foreign manuals on military sciences. It eventually becomes an exposure to the

world of foreign ideas. But in the meantime, we are dealing with the reform of the

military. And it took a long time for the new army to prove itself in the

battlefield. It did so, very successfully in the initial phase of the first world

war, but that was a long time ahead. But the reform of the military was a very

important tool in maintaining the power of the central government. Mahmud II also

reformed the bureaucracy. Clerks now became ministers with European titles. And

Ottoman Muslims were encouraged to learn foreign languages. Student missions were

sent abroad from 1827 onwards. And from 1833, we have the operation in the Ottoman empire of a Translation Bureau. The spread of a growing body of translations, by

means of the printing press, obviously meant with time, the spread of foreign ideas.

The reopening of overseas embassies in 1834, which had been closed down after the fall

of Celine III in 1807, was again, another important exposure to the windows of the

West. It is important to note, this was not a revolution of the masses. This was not

a revolution that was taking place as a result of popular protest. This was a top-

down reform process. And as a top-down reform process, it even encountered as we will

see, at very many junctures, opposition from below, rather than being encouraged by

the population at large. But the reforms definitely strengthened the position of the

central government at the expense of competing agents of power that used to exist in

the Ottoman Empire, such as the Ulama, the Janissaries, the professional guild, the

notables, etc. A major importance of the reforms of Mahmud II is that they

regularized and legitimized change. It was now acceptable to engage in reform and

change, overcoming the initial traditional opposition to this kind of innovation. The

opening to modest reform, in fact, opened the floodgates of Western style

modernization. Mahmud II, in order to legitimize his reforms, concealed the extent of

change by presenting his reforms as the abolition of harmful innovations to protect

Islam. Thereby presenting the reforms as if they were part of a project, not to

weaken the hold of Islam on society, but actually to reinforce it. And the driving

force behind the reforms was the need to preserve the empire. And not answering to

public pressure. The mass of the population was indifferent to the reforms, or even

hostile to change, and the impact on the masses was only very partial. And this is

important to remember, when we move from the mid-19th century, to the 20th or to the

21st century. In later years when there was a revival of tradition through Islamic

movements, there were very many takers amongst the general population. Because the

reform was top-down, when changes in the leadership took place in the Ottoman Empire,

reforms were often set back if the Sultan coming to power was somewhat less

interested in change than his predecessor.

2.1.2.1 The Tanzimat (part 1)

In 1839, the sultan, Abdul Majid succeeded Mahmud II. This is the beginning of a period known in Ottoman history as the Tanzimat. The reorganization, or the reforms of the empire, was from now on that reforms were engaged in officially guided by official policy statements, and this went on for decades. The goals of the Tanzimat, the reforms. Were set out in two reforming edicts. The one, the first, was called the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane, issued in 1839. That is the Noble Edict of the Rose Garden of the Sultan's Palace, as the edict is known. And the second edict proclaiming more or less the same reforms but in greater detail, was issued in 1856 and is known as the Hatt-i Humayun, the Imperial Edict. One should add to these, the Ottoman constitution of 1876. If the reforms were meant to create a more liberal form of government, they failed. The Ottoman Empire as a result of the reforms did not become a more liberal or democratic entity. But if they were designed to strengthen the central government. And prolong the life of the Empire, they succeeded. And the Empire lasted for another 80 more years. And no small achievement. The first priority with these reforms, as in the previous reforms, was the army. Between one-half and two-thirds of all expenditure on the reforms went to the building of various military forces. And money to pay for the army required a change in the method of taxation. The method of taxation was therefore modernized and change form the old form of tax farming. Tax farming known as Iltizam, in Turkish, was a way in which notables were given the right to collect taxes from the citizenry. And in most cases, they pocketed much or most of the taxes for themselves, and this became a very corrupt and ineffective system. There was a need for wide-scale administrative reform, in order to carry out the reforms of the empire. This led to the development of a modern system of education to supply a much needed skilled manpower for the army and the administration. This was a classic example of modernization led by the needs of military reform. Administrative reform was the necessary partner for any reform of the army. One had to remodel the system of provincial government. And this was done by the passing of a new administrative provincial law, the Vilayet Law of 1864, which established a much more centralized government, run from Istanbul. Which allowed for a more effective collection of taxation, and a more effective administration of the government from the center to the provinces. There was a need to tie the provinces more directly to the center. And this was indeed achieved to at least a certain degree as a result of the Tanzimat. The Vilayets, the provinces, were placed under a governor and a structured system of subdistricts under the governor. And all of these run by appointees from Istanbul. Local councils were also created in the various parts of the provinces. And in these local councils, there were some appointed officials, some elected members, and these operated alongside the governors in a form of representation of local opinion, along with a greater measure of government centralization. In 1847, the Ministry of Education was established. This, of course, removed education from the control of the religious establishment where it had been until then. Therefore weakening evermore, the status and the stature of the Ullman in the Ottoman Empire. The established of the Ministry of Education and the creation of these new schools was in recognition of the need for the acquisition of skills for this world. For the advancement of the empire in this world, and the recognition of religion was valuable much more for the next world than it was for this one. And there was, of course, a need to keep up with the advances that were taking place not only in Europe. But in the Christian schools inside the Ottoman empire itself. Now during the Tanzimat, one must confess that education was not entirely revolutionized. It was much more difficult to change schools and education, in the villages, then it was in the towns and the cities. But what was true, was that the Tanzimat did succeed in creating a number of excellent high schools that were created in the main cities of Turkey. And were indeed established to reduce the bureaucrats who would carry on with the reform until the very end of the empire. Reforms in administration in the military eventually, of course, led to reform in the legal system. And indeed the reforms in the legal system were the most revolutionary of all. Why were the reforms in the legal system the most revolutionary? Because in the legal system meant undermining religious law. It meant undermining the weight and the status of the Sharia, it meant changing collective identity. There was nothing that weakened the hold of Islam on society more than the reform of law. And perhaps the most important legal reform of all. Was the decision to grant all subjects of the empire equality before the law. This was not the case until the Tanzimat. Religious minorities, like Jews and Christians, enjoyed religious autonomy in the empire. But they were not equal before the law. Islam was a superior civilization and a superior legal system in the eyes of the believers. Equality before the law essentially meant that Muslims, Jews, and Christians were now all equal before the law, which could no longer be the Sharia. Just by granting equality before the law, one had to erode one of the very basic principles of the Sharia, which preferred Muslims to the Jews and the Christians and other minorities. Equality before the law was a revolutionary change in the sense that now, as opposed to the past when law applied to different communities, the Muslims had their law and the Christians and the Jews were governed by their own legal authorities. Equality before the law meant that the same law applied to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. That is what we can call the territorialization of the legal system. For the first time ever, there is one legal system. That applies to all subjects of the empire. No longer communities enjoying their particular legal orders, but individuals equal before the law. For all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was a great step towards territorial nationalism. Because if the law applies territorially, to all subjects of the empire and not communities as communities. This is a great step towards the territorialization of identity. Territorial nationalism. This required new laws, obviously, that would grant equality to all. It required the training of lawyers and judges to apply the law. The Edict of 1839, in which this equality before the law was proclaimed, was explained and justified as a need to correct the deviation from the Sharia of the last 150 years. And the argument that countries who do not follow the Sharia cannot survive. So, in fact, this erosion of the Sharia, was explained and justified as if it were an upholding of the Sharia. Which in fact, of course it was not. This deviation from the Sharia of the last 150 years that had to be corrected according to the edict of the Sultan had to be fixed by new legislation. But what is new legislation? New legislation is an indication that the Sharia is no longer sufficient. That it is new legislation that must be taken from other bodies, external bodies of law. The 1839 edict introduced principles such as the security of life and property. The abolition of tax farming, the organized and proper enlistment to the army, and of course, justice and equality for all subjects, regardless of their religion. This is a radical deviation from the Sharia. And why new legislation? New legislation obviously because the Sharia is no longer sufficient. God's law was not good enough. This is the secularization of law taken from European sources. And again, a most serious blow to the religious establishment and their authority.

2.1.2.2 The Tanzimat (part 2)

The guaranteeing to equality to the minorities was meant to preserve their loyalty to the empire. But in fact, the opposite was achieved. Equality for the minorities was intended to offer the Christians of the empire who were gradually breaking away as we have seen with the uprising of the Greeks in the 1820s. It was to offer the Christians equal participation within the empire as Ottoman subjects, but the Christians drew a totally different conclusion. If equality, then equality as states of their own outside the empire. And it only accelerated the Christian desire to break away, which most of them indeed did. For the Muslims, this idea of equality of all before the law was a cause for considerable opposition and frustration. This was an incorporation of the practices of the infidels, an undermining of the sharia of the religious law. And not all Muslim subjects of the empire could accept that without complaint. The major outburst came in Damascus in 1860, where there was massacre of 1000 of Christians. In a protest against the Tanzimat. Yeah, against the new reforms. Interesting in this Eventi Damascus was that the Jews of Damascus were not affected by the outbreak of violence, it was not against the Jews who the Muslims had a complaint. Their complaint was against increasing Christian influence. The increase of the influence of Christian powers. The increase of the influence of Christians and their schools. The Jews of the empire did not represent foreign powers. There were no external Jewish powers that threatened the empire. And as a result, the Jews were not seen as partner's to external influence and power. On the contrary, the Jews were seen for what they really were loyal Ottoman subjects. The Christians in the empire had the desire to break away wherever this was territorially feasible and as we will see it wasn't territorially feasible everywhere. But in places where it was like in the Balkans, this was the preferred direction that Christian minorities took. And what was difficult for the empire in this circumstance was that it was no longer possible to suppress the Christians who sought to break away, because of European pressure. And as the British historian, points out, it was a contradiction here. The state was becoming more powerful and more centralized as a result of the reforms, but it's ability to use these new advantages was limited by increasing external influence. One can see this increasing external influence by the timing of the edicts of reform as they were issued. And they were issued at various times when the need to leave an impression of liberalism on Europe was important for the empire. One should not make the mistake, however, by concluding that the reforms were just window dressing for the, for the Europeans. They were not. These were genuine desires for reform from within the Ottoman Empire, out of recognition that the empire had to be reformed and strengthened. But there was at the same time, a need for European assistance. In 1839 the reforms were introduced at a time when the Ottoman Empire desperately needed help against Muhammad Ali, who was threatening Istanbul. In 1856 the reforms were issued at the end of the Crimean War where again, the Ottomans were in need of European support against Russian designs against them. In 1876, the constitution was passed in an effort to avoid European intervention as the empire was going bankrupt. It was at that time also in the mid-1870s that the financial problems of the empire were compounded by the possible intervention of Europeans in their struggles with the Christians in the Balkans. But the constitution was passed in 1876, also for real domestic reasons. There was a movement at that time known as the Young Ottomans. The most well-known spokesperson of which was Namik Kemal. And Namik Kemal had made an argument, noting that the Tanzimat reforms had removed the elements, which had traditionally restrained the strength of the Sultan of the government. The religious establishment, the Ulama and the Janissaries. And the Namil Kemal was right. Those forces that had previously restrained the Sultan were no longer there. So in order to exercise to some form of influence over the Sultan and in order to keep the momentum of reform going when the Sultans in power were elected to do so. There was a need for greater influence on the Sultan through the vehicle of Shura, the Islamic injunction for consultation. This was a justification for the creation of a parliament and for the passing of a constitution. These ideas of constitutionalism and parliament were part of a broader movement to which we will refer to later in greater detail of Islamic reform. That movement which spoke of the need for a synthesis between the West and Western ideas and Islamic values in order to avoid the loss of Islamic identity in the process of westernizing reforms. Reform in the empire was obviously essential, but so was the preservation of the empire's Islamic character. If the empire was reformed, but wouldn't be Islamic. Who needed it? So there had to be this synthesis between the reform and the maintenance of the Islamic character of the empire and this was emphasized further by the troubles of the 1870s. The empire was bankrupted by the expense of the reforms and the loss of Christian territories in the Balkans. And as a result, the migration of Muslims from there into the empire. The empire was becoming more Muslim and less Christian. After the 1876-78 war with the Serbs and the Bulgarians that led to further Christian gains and to another war with Russia and Ottoman defeat, there were more vocal critics of reform and resentment for the concessions that would be made. So, it seemed to Christians and to Christian powers. The new sultan, Abdulhamid II, dissolved the newly formed parliament in 1878. The Constitution remained in place, but wasn't acted upon. And Pan-Islamism became a feature that the Sultan emphasized as a common front of Muslim peoples against the European-Christian empires. Muslim solidarity at this phase was still much easier to mobilize amongst the masses than more secular notions of nationalism. If the Tanzimat was considered a process of liberalization than this suspension of the Constitution in 1878, marks the failure of that movement. But it wasn't really a process of liberalization, it was a bureaucratic and not a liberal movement. The reforms were not just lip service to Europe. They were genuine reforms of government and the military, which serve the purposes of the empire and its long term survival. And with all its shortcomings and all its limitations, the Tanzimat, nevertheless, laid the foundations of modern Turkey. As Bernard Lewis puts it, the biggest achievement of the Tanzimat was in the field of education. A new group of educated elite emerged out of the new schools, but at the same time, there was also widespread hostility towards the reforms as some kind of foreign intrusion or foreign invention. But in reality, there was only one option and that was to move forwards towards more reform and more change. And for Turkey, there was no turning back.

2.2.1 Muhammad Ali in Egypt (part 1)

Now let's have a look at the reforms in Egypt throughout the 19th Century. There were reforms that were begun by Muhammad Ali. At the end of the 18th Century, Egypt was in a state of anarchy. As a result of the conflicts between various Mamluk groups. The Mamluks were slave soldiers originally. But actually even though they began as slave soldiers, being soldiers they were eventually the power to be. And it is they who controlled Egypt for very many years long before the invasion of Napoleon. The French invasion, however, in 1798 ushered in a new era in Egypt's history. A struggle for power between the French and the Ottomans, a struggle for power between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, after the removal of the French. And Muhammad Ali who arrived in Egypt in 1801 as second in command of Albanian troops who had been sent by the Ottomans. To take over the rule of Egypt, from the French. Muhammad Ali himself took control of Egypt and forced the Ottomans to recognize him as the governor of Egypt. Between 1809 and 1812, Muhammad Ali went about destroying the power of the Mamluks, who remained a powerful military force in Egypt until then. There was a huge massacre of Mamluks by Muhammad Ali in Cairo in 1811. And their power in Egypt was brought to an end. The crushing of the Mamluks in Egypt in 1811 by Muhammad Ali was similar to the removal of the Janissaries that took place in the Ottoman Empire in 1826. But whereas, in the Ottoman Empire, reforms made progress and were halted at various junctures, in Muhammad Ali's case, reforms continued tirelessly. The first step for Muhammad Ali was the rebuilding of the army in Egypt after the model of European conscript armies. He tried, initially, by bringing slaves from the Sudan as recruits for Egypt's army, but this was a terrible failure. Between 1820 and 1824 Muhammad Ali brought to Egypt some 20,000 Sudanese but most of them died. Muhammad Ali then took the revolutionary step of recruiting Egyptian Arab peasants for the Egyptian Army. This was a revolutionary step because for the first time it was the local population, the people of the country serving in the military much like the conscript armies in Europe. And the conscripting of Egyptian Arab peasants into the Egyptian Army paved the way gradually in the future to the rise of these Arabs to power in Egypt. In the meantime under Muhammad Ali, the Egyptian Army was still officered by Turkish Circassian officers, that is, officers who remained from the Turkish bureaucracy and military or from the Mamluk armies of the past. Generally speaking, Egypt was not under the same military pressure as the Ottoman Empire. Where military reforms led to reforms in many other domains. In Egypt, it is military reform that is indeed, an inducement for reforms in other regions, in other spheres. But there is also a stress on economic development in Egypt, as distinguished from the system that took place in the Empire. Economic development in Egypt was a very important facet for the promotion of local wealth that would enable Muhammad Ali to maintain his power. Ministries were developed and provincial administration was advanced. Extensive duties were given to provincial officials, such as supervising conscription and taxation, public works and economic development. And of course, learning from Europe. The dispatch of students abroad to learn in Europe began with Muhammad Ali in 1813. Vocational schools were established in Egypt. A school for military officers in 1816. For accountants in 1826, for civilian administrators in 1829 and 1834. For doctors, the study of medicine in 1827, for the study of languages in 1835, an economic modernization was a critical source of resources for Muhammad Ali's regime. This meant the construction of irrigation works and the development of the market for export, especially cotton. Muhammad Ali established industrial monopolies that were entirely under his control. He also established rather ambitious factory industries that were in the end much less successful. These factory industries were established specially for army needs for the manufacture of products from iron, leather, and also even shipbuilding. There was a considerable increase in Egyptian trade. And the direction of trade was much more with Europe than with the Ottoman Empire, as had been the case before. By 1849 cotton accounted for 31% of Egyptian exports. All under the control of the central government of Muhammad Ali. Communications were improved very impressively. The use of steamboats on the Nile and in the canals. And the construction of new canals, such as the opening of the Mahmoudia Canal in 1819, linking Cairo with Alexandria. The population of Alexandria rose from 15,000 in 1805 to 150,000 in 1847. With a large number of foreigners. Egypt was transformed from a condition of anarchy as it had been before the Napoleonic invasion when Egypt was still under the reign of the Mamluks into a strong, centralized state which possessed unprecedented power over its people. During the period from 1811 until 1841, Muhammad Ali was engaged in a series of foreign military adventures. In 1811 to 1813 he took a successful campaign to subjugate the Wahabis, the Islamic fundamentalists in the Hijaz in order to strengthen the sultan's position in the region, operating on the sultan's behalf of course. And in 1818, he destroyed the Wahabi base in Central Arabi in the Najd. In 1839, he was once again occupied with the Arabian Peninsula. In 1820 to 1826 he brought the Sudan under Egyptian control, that didn't prove to be a very profitable conquest. During the 1820s he assisted the Sultan against the Greeks, but then as we have already seen, in 1831, he invaded Syria to fight against the Ottomans. And he might have considered advancing as far as Istanbul, if it weren't for his fear of the Russians and other Europeans. In 1840, he eventually had to settle only for Egypt, and its hereditary governorship, in his family. Malcolm Yaffe discusses the possible reasons for these adventurous undertakings of Muhammad Ali. And there are various theories that have been brought up to explain Muhammad Ali's behavior. One of these is that he was an Arab nationalist. That he had an Arab state in his mind. But this theory doesn't hold much ground, as Muhammad Ali didn't even speak Arabic, but Turkish and regarded Egyptian Arabs with a measure of contempt. And Arab nationalism in the 1830s or the 1840s was hardly spoken about at all. Arabism as an identity was a nationalism expressed at the very end of the 19th century and hardly at all in Muhammad Ali's time. There is another theory that he was an Egyptian nationalist. That Muhammad Ali was engaging in this expansion as an Egyptian ruler, adopting Egyptian national goals. It's true that Egypt was his base, but Muhammad Ali didn't have any notion of Egyptian nationalism. And Egyptian nationalism was also an identity which comes to the fore only at the end of the 19th Century, way beyond Muhammad Ali's time. A third theory sees Muhammad Ali acting as a, in the Muslim and Ottoman context. Seeking advancement within the Ottoman system, that is increasing his power as a local potentate within the Ottoman system. A fourth theory sees Muhammad Ali simply as a military adventurer. And I think the answer to this variation of theories is found in the combination of the third and the fourth, that is Muhammad Ali was a combination of one acting in the Muslim and Ottoman context, seeking to advance his own power within the Ottoman system. As an autonomous ruler within the Ottoman system and as a military adventurer. The ideas of nationalism that some wished to associate with him are a figment of their imagination.

2.2.2 Muhammad Ali in Egypt (part 2)

After Muhammad Ali, there is a certain slowdown in the process of reform, which picks up again under Muhammad Ali's Grandson, Khedive Ismail. Khedive is a title he gave to himself in order to emphasize the independence of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, the Khedive being a title, uh, of ruler that suggested that he was much more than just a governor under the Ottomans but the autonomous ruler of Egypt. Khedive Ismail who ruled from 1863 to 1879, is described by the historian P. J. Vatikiotis as the impatient Europeanizer. Indeed he was. Khedive Ismail was one who saw Egypt as part of Europe. And really he was an impatient Europeanizer. He provided the means for the great advancement of the country and the emergence of a Westernized intellectual elite in government, education, and letters. Unfortunately, however, he also bankrupted the country because of his impatient Europeanizing, leading eventually to British occupation. But there were very important developments during Khedive Ismail's time. Perhaps, chief of these, and of lasting influence, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Ismail was lavish and at times, reckless in his expenses. Bringing to Egypt great economic stress. In 1875, Britain bought the Khedive shares in the Suez Canal and became the major shareholder in this key artery to India, a factor which played very importantly in the development of Britain's imperial role in Egypt and in the Middle East as a whole. Great advances were made during Ismail's time. In agriculture, especially in cotton for export expanding the cotton industry and the sugar industry as well. The construction of canals, bridges, telegraph, railway lines, and the modernization of Egyptian cities. The immigration of Europeans in great numbers who were needed for their expertise is also a factor of great importance during Khedive Ismail's rule. From a few thousand Europeans in Egypt in 1860, there were more than 100,000 in 1876. Many Egyptians were in daily contact with Europeans in business, in European modeled schools. Khedive Ismail found that specialized schools, for lawyers, administrators and even religious Sheikhs. For engineers, technicians, linguists, teachers, and craftsmen. He was the first ruler in Egypt to bring education to girls. Ismail encouraged Western habits, Western dress, and a Western lifestyle in general. This was all a huge step forward towards the creation of modern Egypt. But at the same time, there were mounting troubles. Financial bankruptcy first and foremost and increasing foreign control of Egyptian finances as a result of that. There was mounting disaffection of the fledgling nationalist movement in Egypt against this increasing foreign control, and this all eventually led to the invasion of Egypt by Britain in 1882 to ensure, initially, the repayment of the debt. And the British stayed for 70 years. From the very beginning of Muhammad Ali's rule, at the beginning of the 19th century, Egypt was set on a different path from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt was becoming a separate, independent, political entity. And this only increased after the British invasion in 1882 and the development rather rapidly of an Egyptian nationalist movement. Well before the development of an Arab nationalist movement.

2.3.1 Islamic Reform or Modernism (part 1)

This long period of reform throughout the 19th century gave rise to a unique and historically important debate on how the Islamic world should respond to this crisis of modernity in this sphere of ideas. Benedict Anderson has observed that in Western Europe, the eighteenth century marked not only the dawn of the age of nationalism but the dusk of religious modes of thought, which was superseded by rationalist secularism. But in the Middle East, it was not so. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, we have an era of profound ideological ferment and Islamic reform as Western ideas such as secularism and nationalism dominated the local intellectual discourse. But in this region, in the Middle East, as opposed to Europe, the dawn of nationalism was never quite the dusk of religious modes of thought. Rather, the two continued to compete with each other, experiencing different periods of relative success in the marketplace of ideas. There is, of course, an inherent tension between faith, that is religious belief, and secularism. For centuries, it was believed amongst Muslims that society was legitimate only as long as it acted in accordance with Muslim religious law, the Sharia. But the essence of secularism, in addition to the separation of religion and state, is accepting the assumption that no one person or group has a monopoly over the absolute truth. Secularism means tolerance for difference and disagreement. For different perceptions, regarding the desired political order. And this is completely at variance with religious belief and the divine political order. The divine political order, as understood in the world of Islam, was a political order that could not be shared with others who did not belong to the same group of believers. And there is a clear distinction, or difference, between the divine order and the man-made order, shaped in accordance with man's will, and not God's revelation. There was in Islam always the difference, between the House of Islam, Dar al-Islam, that part of the world ruled by religious Islamic law and by Muslims. And Dar al-Harb, the House of War, that part of the world outside the world of Islam. And in this distinction between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the House of Islam and the House of War, the House of Islam was self-contained and had its own legal and ideological system. But now in the modern era, we have the recognition of the inability to remain self-contained within the ideological content of Dar al-Islam. There is an understanding of the fact. But Western superiority was not only about knowledge and technology. This superiority had a theoretical and philosophical foundation, that had to be penetrated by the Muslims to understand the sources of Western power. This leads to a movement which became known as the Movement of Islamic Reform or alternatively, Islamic modernism. This was an effort by Muslim thinkers to find a compromise between these obvious tensions between faith and human reason, between tradition and modality. They attempted to show the compatibility of Islam and modern ideas of institution. Reason, science, technology, democracy, constitutions, and representative government, all these the Islamic reformers maintained did not conflict with Islam if correctly interpreted. There was a need to answer the European offensive against Islam. The attack made by Europeans on Islamic culture, that it itself was a cause for the stagnation of the Muslims. And this ideological offensive made by Europeans against Islam was, in the eyes of the Muslim reformers, more dangerous than an invasion and then occupation. An answer had to be found to this contention that Islamic culture was a cause for stagnation. The French philosopher, Ernest Renan, who was also a Middle Eastern scholar, is famous for his critique on Islam as being incompatible with modern civilization. This was part of a European feeling of superiority which was expressed in many ways, such as in Rudyard Kipling's White Man's Burden. Or in the French belief in what they call their mission civilisatrice, their need to civilize other peoples. And in the Middle East itself, significant openings were made to Western influence and Western cultural impact. The new education system that was created in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt gave a new status to those who had received Western-style education. The spread of foreign languages, printing in Arabic, newspapers and journals in Arabic, which carried new ideas into the local discourse. The impressions gained of those who visited Europe as part of the student missions that were sent from the Ottoman Empire or from Egypt to Europe. One such student who visited Europe was the Egyptian Rifa'a al-Tahtawi who traveled to Paris during Muhammad Ali's reign and returned to Egypt with some very important impressions. Tahtawi noted that in France, even the common people know how to read and write... but among their ugly beliefs, he said, was this, that the intellect and virtue of their wise men are greater than the intelligence of the prophets. And the question was against this kind of intellectual background. The question was how was it possible to adopt the sources of European power in order to become a part of the modern world. Would it be possible to learn Western ways without dissolving the Islamic identity of the community? Could Muslims accept the ideas of the modern West without betraying their own past and their own identity? Of course, the Christians in the Middle East didn't have such a problem, and it was much easier for them to adopt and incorporate ideas from the West than it was for their Muslim neighbors.

2.3.2 Islamic Reform or Modernism (part 2)

First in line of our Muslim reformers is Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. Afghani lived from 1838 to 1897 and was actually. A Shia of Persian origin, he took the name Afghani in order to appear to Egyptians and to others as a Sunni. And Afghani operated in the main from Egypt. Afghani was a very important major catalyst for Islamic reform and change. al-Afghani was a great supporter of modern science and as one who portrayed Islam and presented Islam as a religion of progress and change. Correctly understood Afghani argued modernity posed no threat to Islam if it was only correctly interpreted and understood. This required the reopening of the gates of ijtihad. Ijtihad in Arabic independent interpretation of Islamic law and jurisprudence. Reopening the gates of Ijtihad meant allowing for more liberal interpretation of Islamic religion. The gates of each Jihad in the Sunni tradition had been closed in the tenth century. Leading of Ghani to criticize the stagnation and the imitation of the past that was so customary. Afghani argued, Islam was a religion of reason and action. Muslims could claim now to reappropriate the sources of Western power, such as reason, science and technology. Because as he argued they were, in fact, part of the original Islamic heritage. In earlier times, indeed it was the contribution of Islamic civilization. To philosophy, medicine, science and mathematics that had been so important for the evolution of these fields of modern knowledge. They were part of the Muslims' own glorious past Afrani argued. And therefore they could simply reclaim what was originally theirs and handed over by them to the West. For Afghani, there is what he called a Pan Islamic identity or solution. Pan Islam was a form of national solidarity that united Muslim believers. In their competition with the West. But speaking of pan Islam as a form of national solidarity, is a deviation from the traditional view of what being a Muslim is. Afghani was now arguing that being a Muslim is a form of national solidarity. Not just their belief in divine revelation and living in accordance with the Sharia. The traditional view was not about Islam as the basis for the unity of Muslims against the European threat. In Afghani's thinking, Islam had become a kind of nationalist ideology, of active solidarity. Albert Hourani, the British historian, writes the following of Afghani, in Afghani's mind, Islam meant activity. The true attitude of the Muslim, Afghani argued, is not one of passive resignation to whatever might come as coming directly from God. It is one of responsible activity in doing the will of God which of course is something very different. Man's decisions were his own, according to Hourani. But God had given man through reason and the revelation of the prophets, the indication of how these decisions should be made. Believing in pre-destination meant that God be, will be with man if he acted rightly. This belief encourages activism and initiative and not passivity. And this is what Hermione was trying to convey to the Islamic world to which he belonged. This was true not only for the activities geared towards attaining happiness in the next world as the religious people would believe. But also for happiness and success in this world, which was really what Avrani was all about. The laws of Islam, Avrani argued, were also the laws of human nature. Therefore, if man obeys the teaching of Islam, he follows the rules of nature. In this way, he obtains happiness and success in this world, and what is true for the individual, is also true for the society as a whole, and when societies follow the rules of Islam, they get stronger, and when they disobey, they get weaker. Islam, Afghani argued, requires solidarity and mutual responsibility. And these form the basis of the strength of nations. The importance of Afghani was not that he was a secular nationalist himself, which he wasn't really. His importance derived from the fact that he laid the ideological foundations for the penetration of secular nationalist ideas. The problem however of Afghani's line of argument was this. If there is an identity between the laws of Islam and the laws of nature, why not adopt the laws of nature in their entirety? Why not just become a secularist, and abandon Islam altogether? And Afghani and people like him opened the floodgates to questions just like that. Perhaps Afghani's most enthusiastic and important disciple was the Egyptian Muhammad Abdu, who lived from 1849 to 1905. Abduh's emphasis was constantly on human reason and the contention that there was no inherent conflict between religion and reason. Between religion and modern science. The adoption of the sources of Western power. Rationalism, science and technology were all possible without really being in conflict with Islam, so he argued. After the Islamic reformism meant the penetration of the belief. In the rational activity of man. This was a dramatic shift in attitude, because it meant the legitimization of change and innovation, not only in military practices or in administration, but the legitimization of change and innovation in the awfully sensitive sphere of ideas. This emphasis on the compatibility of Islam and modernity was not an attempt to curb the process of modernization, but an attempt to control it. To have a process of modernization that would be placed within an Islamic framework. That would tolerate Westernization and modernization without disrupting, without dissolving the Islamic identity of the community. For those who received Western style education in the new schools, Abdul's perception of Islam enabled them to adopt Western secular ideas without any sense of betraying their past or their collective identity. The renewal of Islam based on selective integration of modern ideas, rather than a wholesale unrestricted Western secular modernization was what of Harney and Abdul wanted to achieve the controlled process of westernization and modernization without losing the Islamic identity and values of the society. Abduh himself was not an Arab nationalist, but the ideas that he raised provided the foundations for Arab nationalism. Because Abduh, in his desire for reform, tended to emphasize both human wisdom and human reason, as well as the importance of returning to the first original Arabic Islamic ideal. That is Islam of the Arabs, in the days of the prophet, and shortly thereafter, was the ideal form of Islam, to which modern Muslims should aspire. This emphasis on the Arab nature of early Islam was later on a contribution as we will see to the emergence of Arab nationalism.

2.3.3 Islamic Reform or Modernism (part 3)

A student and disciple of Abduh was a Syrian by the name of Rashid Rida who lived from 1865 to 1935. Rida, though born in Syria like many in his time, was active in Egypt. Egypt under the British occupation was a place where intellectual freedom was far more guaranteed than under the Ottomans in the Ottoman empire. Rida was a devoted disciple of Abduh. But, Rida went in a much more Islamic fundamentalist direction. In his later years, Rida was deeply disturbed by what began to look like the overwhelming westernization and secularization of Muslim society. Rida established a movement called the Salafiyya Movement. Salafiyya, named after the prophet, and his close circle in the early years of Islam, known as the Salaf. And therefore the Salafiyya movement, that movement devoted to returning to the Islamic original format of the prophet's period, became known as Salafiyya. Rashid Rida tended to glorify Arab Islam in it's early years. And the emphasis here is on Arab Islam. God's revelation as Rida pointed out was in Arabic. And it was the Arabs who were the vanguard of the Ummah of the Islamic nation of believers. And therefore the revitalization of Islam in the modern era depended on the return of Arab Muslim leadership of the Ummah. And it was the fault of the Turks. People like Rida argued that the Islamic Ummah had entered a period of decline. So this kind of thinking, this kind of emphasis on the Arabic nature of early Islam was an emphasis on the centrality of the Arabs. To this effort of strengthening the Muslim nation, the Ummah, in the present. This is not quite Arab nationalism yet. After all, Rida is speaking about the revival of Islam. It is the importance of the Arab role in this Islamic revival that he is speaking of. Therefore he doesn't speak of breaking away from the empire, or of undermining the Ottomans. Although after the young Turk revolution of 1908 and their growing criticism of religion, Rida's tendency toward Arab nationalism grew. But Rida always emphasized the restoration of the caliphate that would be governed by religious law. So it is at the end. It is still in Rida's mind. The revival of the Islamic community that he is speaking of and not out of nationalism per se. In this line of reformists, after Rida, perhaps the most important of them all is Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi. Kawakibi lived from 1849 to 1902. Like Rida, born in Syria. But he, too, like others, ended up in Cairo because of the relative safety of the British occupation. Kawakibi was more radical than Rida, on the centrality and, indeed, the superiority of the Arabs. The caliphate should return to the Arabs, he argued. The Ottomans are not capable of bringing back the old glory of the caliphate. He had some other rather vague ideas of a spiritual caliphate, something like the papacy. This Christian notion of separation of religion and state was something that Kawakibi also referred to. But his main contribution is in his emphasis on the centrality of the Arabs to any kind of Muslim reform. So in conclusion, we should emphasize the following. All these reformers contributed to the spread of the idea that politics is more about man's will than that of God. The centrality to the will of man, and therefore, ideas like self-determination and the sovereignty of man are those that are either directly or indirectly, promoted by these Islamic reformists. The British historian Ellie Kedourie wrote a book about Afghani and Abduh. And it was called an essay on religious unbelief and political activism in modern Islam. And Kedourie argued that Afghani and Abduh were not dedicated Islamic reformers at all, but were actually engaged in the subversive unbelief under a false, religious cover. After all, their ideas stood in complete contrast with traditional Islam. What they really were doing, however religious they may or may not have been, they were definitely breaking down the walls of Islamic self sufficiency in the realm of ideas. Intentionally or not, they set the stage for the secular and secularizing platform of nationalism. Nationalism, after all, is an idea that believes in the actions of man. Nationalism is based on the collective identity of people, by their language, by the territory they inhabit, and not their religious belief. The disciples of Afghani and Abduh went in very different directions. After all, if there was no contradiction between reason and religion, one could argue two very different things. On the one hand, if Islam was reason, why take the western road to modernity? Alternatively one could say, if Islam was reason, why not westernize completely? So you have ultra seculars on the one hand. And traditionalists on the other, who reasserted a self sufficient Islamic alternative to the West. Rashid Rida was one of those and he became a mentor of the Muslim brethren that was founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. The struggle between modernity and tradition is the connecting theme of this entire course. And the Arab as we will see later on is just the latest chapter in these intriguing saga of the modern Middle East.