About this course
This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!
Lecture transcript
The disappointment with Arab Nationalism that lent its impetus to the emergence of territorial identities and their promotion in some of the Arab states, was also the background for a very different development and that is the revival of Islamic qualities. The disappointment with secular nationalism and of Nasser's defeat was also the background for the emergence of the Islamic political revival. The panacea that Nasser's improved not to be the huge political setback as a result of the war in 1967. If added to the economic Malays, that developing the Arab country as a result of the process of development and modernization, population grows and massive urbanization were all at the background to these rise of the political Islam. As James Piscatori has mentioned, most rural migrants to the Arab cities, quickly became the urban poor, victims of their own hope, swallowed by the very process which they believed would liberate them. This sense of not belonging, was clearly connected to the turn to religion. Migration from the countryside generally help to spread rule attitudes in the cities and this meant particularly the greater emphasis on religious tradition amongst other classes too religious instinct ran deep. And this was especially so after the second ideologies like Nasserism and Baathism had failed to deliver. The ideological Underpinnings of the Islamist Trend were related, first and foremost, to the opposition to secularist modernization and secular nationalism and territorialism. What it was that they were after it was not against modernity and nationalism, but modernity and nationalism without their secularist thrust. The Islamist sought modernity, raft in the preservation of traditional identities, norms, and values, the need to base society on Islamic law. Since the late 19th century, there were three main theories that came to explain the relative weakness of Muslim societies in comparison to the west. The one was that the decline was the result of the deviation from true Islam. And that true Islam correctly interpreted did not conflict with Western ideas, and rationalism, and science. These were the Islamic reformers of the late 19th century. Like , and Mohammed Abdu. Those to whom we referred at great length earlier on in our course. A second explanation was that the relative weakness of the Muslim world was the fault of Islam, itself, and that Islam, itself, was used as an obstacle to change and revival. This is the attitude we could directly relate to secularists like Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of secular Republic of Turkey. And then there was the third school, those who argued that the retreat of the Muslim world was because of the intoxication with the West. That is not because they were not western enough but that the Muslims have gone too far in the process of westernization as Hasan al-Banna the founding father of the Muslim Brethren or the revolutionaries in Iran would argue. In their view, the Islamic modernists had failed because they themselves were too Western-oriented, seeking to establish Islamic justifications for Western-inspired reform. These new critics of Westernization thought in terms of a return to the idea of Islamic self-sufficiency, that which the modernists like of Ani and Abdu have begun to doubt. Islam is the solution claimed Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brethren 1928. But it was perhaps the key ideological Muslim Brethren in Egypt Sayyid Qutb who lived from 1906 to 1966. The year in which he was hanged by the Nazarite regime in Europe. Qutb wrote considerably more than Hassan al-Banna, and it was he who became the main ideologue of the Muslim Brethren in the second part of the 20th century. Qutb expanded on the theme of the new Jahiliyya. The new Jahiliyya was a term that was coined by the Pakistani Muslim thinker, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, who lived from 1903 to 1979. And it is he who developed the concept of what was called a Jahiliyya society. And what did all this mean? The Jahiliyya is that period of barbarism and ignorance in the Muslim belief that preceded the advent of Islam. Therefore, societies that were described in the present as Jahiliyya societies were societies that were un-Islamic, societies that were not governed by the Sharia, by Islamic religious law. The new Jahiliyya therefore, was about the present not the past that preceded the advent of Islam. Jahiliyya therefore according to Mawdudi and followed by Kudu was not a period of history but a condition, a state of affairs which could apply to the present as well. They could be no coalescence and compromise with western thought. But the west should be rejected because of it's secular permissive and materialistic ways. Cotum went through a process of radicalization during his imprisonment before his execution by the Nasserite regime. And according to Cotum's more radical thinking, he justified the use of jihad, holy war and revolution, to overthrow these infidel regimes, that is, regimes that did not implement the Sharia. They were jihadi regimes or infidel regimes, those that because of their unbelief should be overthrown even by revolution. And Cotum therefore, for these beliefs, was imprisoned under the Nasserite regime, and as we have mentioned, hanged in 1966. According to James Gelvin, these new radical Islamists were able to counterpose their own brand of cultural authenticity as represented by Islam to the imported secular nationals: creeds, which, they argued, brought nothing but oppression, economic stagnation, and defeat to the region. So what were the specific complaints of these new radical Islamists? They argued against the marginalization of religion, politics, law, and society. They dismissed and disagreed with what they called the cult of the nation-state and its leadership. Nothing less than a form of heresy that is the cult and the belief in the leadership of the state rather than belief in religion and God. The state monopoly over education was unacceptable because it was devoid of Islamic values. The mass media that were controlled by the state spread permissiveness and generally on Islamic valued the countries like Egypt and others were open to the Western Economy and globalization. Leading to corruption and to a consumer society that began to look like the dismissive societies of the west, that they referred to as Coca-Cola societies. The real enemy, they argued, was from within. That is, the regime itself. This infidel regime that had to be removed even before the struggle against Israel. And these new radical Islamists had an ever increasing influence on the Islamization of Arab societies in the latter part of the 20th century.
Lecture transcript
First, again let's look at the process in Egypt. While Sadat encouraged Egypt's raison d'etat and territorial identity. In the process of de-Nasserization, that is, weakening the Nasserites Institutions that challenged Sadat's leadership in his early years. Sadat also allowed for a greater measure of freedom for the Islamists. And Islamists became particularly active at the universities. Where they became in their own mind, the vanguard of the that is, the vanguard of the Islamic community. Which they sought to Islamize from the universities and thereafter. When their influence seemed to gain too much ground, the Islamists were suppressed by the same Sadat. And it is this suppression of the Islamists that eventually lead to the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. And those who killed Sadat, who came from an Islamic Jihadi organization. Proclaimed the killing of Sadat to be the killing of Pharoah, that is Egypt's pre-Islamic leader. Sadat's great fault was that he was governing Egypt as a pre-Islamic, that is, generally an Islamic state. Sadat was succeeded by President Husni Mubarak. And Mubarak allowed a somewhat greater measure of political pluralism. And in practice this meant that the government acquiesced in the erosion of the secularizing foundations of the Egyptian Republic. Under Nasser, sharia courts were abolished and were accorded no role at all, even with respect to matters of personal status. Which was much further than many other Muslim countries had gone in such respects. Under Mubarak however, the regime allowed the Islamists to apply the sharia to cases in the secular courts. The courts were regularly used by Islamic lawyers to bring secular intellectuals, writers, professors, artists, and generalists to trial. And to convict them for the purely religious crimes of blasphemy and apostacy. Egyptian society from the late 1980s onwards showed ever more external signs of increasing religiosity. The construction of new mosques was rampant. People of all classes flocked in great numbers to Friday prayers. The Hijab, the veil, the scarf that covered the head and shoulders was worn by over 80% of women. And the consumption of religious literature was constantly on the rise. While movie going, alcohol consumption and the patronage of bars and nightclubs all declined. Islamists control the teacher's training college where they train future teachers who would disseminate Islamization into the classroom. In the last 1980s, the Ministry of Education in Egypt promoted greater religiosity in the schools. Through a revised curriculum and religious sentiments and ideas was said to dominate the schools. The mainstream print and electronic media were likewise deeply influenced by Islamization. The mostly state owned press shifted towards conservative religiosity. And self centers it abandoning much of the secular liberal content of the 1950s and the 1960s. Official religious publications were decidedly anti-secular. And national radio and television promoted a religious sensibility by increasing the number of Islamic oriented programs. As Asef Bayat has noted, Islamic sentiment thus eroded nationalism's secular expression. In state schools Islamic religious education was part of the Arabic language and history curriculum. Which were compulsory subjects for non-Muslims too. School text books tended to represent Egypt as a Muslim society. And sometimes he included specifically anti-Christian texts. And the curriculum required students to recognize the supremacy of Islam and the special relationship between Islam and the state of Egypt. The Islamization of society was therefore having a negative impact on Egyptian social cohesion. And on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The situation of the Coptic Christian minority became steadily more precarious. As they were exposed to increasing levels of intolerance and violence. The regime had consciously acquiesced in the transformation of Egypt. It would actually become what Yasser Byart has described as a secular religious state. In Syria, the religious factor in politics was interminably related to the sectarian structure of Syrian society. Just like in Iraq, Syria and the Baath party had always been deeply influenced by sectarian politics. Ever since the rise to power of the Ba'ath in 1963, sectarian solidarity played an important role in regime stability. In fact, never openly admitted by the men in power, but a fact just the same. Ba'thi secularism was a vehicle for the sectarian domination of the Alawi minority. The systemic marginalization of religion was a blessing for the Alawis whose heterodoxical faith was a political and social liability. Therefore from it's inception in 1963, the Ba'athist regime was avowedly secular. And even radically so, during the rule of the so called Neo-Ba'ath from 1966 to 1970. But under Hafez al-Assad who came to power in 1970, the Ba'ath changed course. After rising to the presidency, Assad sought to enhance the religious legitimacy of the Alawis. In 1973, he reinstated the clause in the Constitution, requiring the head of state to be a Muslim. A clause that the neo-Ba'ath had previously removed. Assad also managed to get the leading Lebanese Shite cleric . To recognize the Alawis as orthodox Shi'is. And thus as ostensible Muslims. Constitutionally eligible for the presidency in Syria. And from then onwards the link with the Shi'is in Lebanon has been particularly strong. But many in the Sunni majority community of Syria continue to regard the Alawis as socially inferior heretics. Who's political dominance was an anathema. But, after having crushed the Sunni opposition, as expressed by the Muslim brethren in 1982. President Assad adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the Muslim Brethren. That was matched in the 1990s by a greater measure of tolerance toward religion in general. The process begun Hafez of having the Alawis accepted as Shi'is was accelerated under Bashar, his son. Bashar a president of Syria developed a more sustained program of Shi'ization, generally, with the help of the Iranians. As a means of legitimizing the Alawi community in the eyes of the Sunni majority. Hundreds of Alawis were sent to Iran for religious training. While Iranian men of religion toured Syria to preach on Shite religion to the Alawis areas. As the regime sought to rid itself of it's former ultra secularists anti religious image. The Syria mass media diligently presented to the Syrian public and the world at large as a bona-fide Muslim. Bashar like Hafez before him made a deliberate effort to portray himself not only as a Muslim, but as a devout one. Furthermore since the 1990s religious schools have opened all over the country. Religious literature was readily available and was sold to the general public in far greater quantities than books on other subjects. The number of students studying Sharia in the university was constantly on the rise. And popular religious programs, just like in other Arab countries, were broadcast on national television. Syrian society, especially its Sunni components, was becoming more observant. At least if judged, for example, by participation in prayer or the adoption of the Islamic dress code. But all of the above failed to overcome the sectarian fault lines. Many in the Sunni Majority community continued to regard the Alawis as socially inferior heretics, which political dominance was unbearable. And when the Arab Spring erupted in Syria, it did not take long for it to develop into an all out sectarian civil war. Even in Iraq under Saddam Hussein the regime went through an Islaming phase. Shite opposition to the essentially Sunni regime was always ruthlessly suppressed. After Saddam Huseins final rise to power in 1979. Along with his effort to forge an Iraqi sense of national consciousness, drawing on Iraq's supposed pre-Islamic, Babylonian past. Saddam was not aversed to exploiting political Islam when he felt that such a shift would better serve his purpose. Thus while cracking down on Shi'ite political movements. Outlawing the Shi'ite opposition party a Dawa. And arresting and executing Shi'ite leaders. The regime changed gears in its political language. Saddam even began to claim direct descent from Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, revered by the Shi'ite as the rightful successor to the Prophet. The employment of Islamic themes for regime legitimization. Increased consistently from a towing of the Islamic line for most of the war with Iran in 1980s to deliberate Islamic flag waving in the 1990s. During the war with Shi'ite Iran hundreds of thousands of Iraq Shi'ites fought shoulder to shoulder with their Sunni compatriots. Partly out of loyalty to the state of Iraq and to their own Iraqiness. Partly out of intimidation by the state's ruthless organs of suppression. The war, however, also made it increasingly clear to the regime just how effectively the Iranians had made religion into a mobilizing force. As opposed to the weakness of Ba'ath ideology in emotionally motivating Iraqis. This further encouraged the process of Islamization, which peaked on the eve of the Gulf War in early 1991. When the words of Allahu Akbar were embroidered on the Iraqi flag. But these efforts were obviously artificial and got nowhere in bridging the sectarian divide between the Sunni's and Shia's in Iraq. After Saddam's overthrow by the U.S. in 2003, as we have already seen, the country rapidly degenerated into Sectarian strife between Sunni's and Shia's which has yet to come to an end over a decade later.
Lecture transcript
In Syria, the religious factor in politics was intimately related to the sectarian structure of Syrian society. Just like in Iraq, Syria, under the Ba'ath Party, had always been deeply influenced by sectarian politics. And ever since the rise to power of the Ba'ath in 1963, Alawi sectarian solidarity played an important role in regime stability. A fact never openly admitted by the men in power, but a fact just the same. Ba'thi secularism was a vehicle for the sectarian domination of the Alawi minority. The systematic marginalization of religion was a blessing for the Alawis, whose heterodoxical faith was a political and social liability. Therefore, from its inception in 1963, the Ba'thist regime was avowedly secular and even radically so during the reign of the so-called Neo-Ba'th from 1966 to 1970. But under Hafiz al-Asad who came to power in 1970, the Ba'th changed course. After rising to the Presidency, Asad sought to enhance the religious legitimacy of the Alawis. In 1973, he reinstated the clause in the constitution requiring the head of state to be a Muslim, a clause that the Neobathis had previously removed. Asad also managed to get the leading Lebanese Shi'ite cleric, Moussa Sadr to recognize the Alawis as orthodox Shi'is, and thus as ostensible Muslims, constitutionally eligible for the presidency in Syria. And from then onwards, the link with the Shi'is in Lebanon has been particularly strong. But many in the Sunni majority community of Syria here continue to regard the Alawis as socially inferior heretics, whose political dominance was an anathema. But after having crushed the Sunni opposition, as expressed by the Muslim Brethren in 1982, President Asad adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood that was matched in the 1990s by a greater measure of tolerance toward religion in general. The process begun by of having the Alawis accepted the Shii's was accelerated under Bashar, his son. Bashar as President of Syria developed a more sustained program of Shi'ization generally, with the help of the Iranians, as a means of legitimizing both the Alawi community, and the regime in the eyes of the Sunni majority. Hundreds of Alawis were sent to Iran for religious training. While Iranian men of religion toured Syria to preach on Shi'ite religion to the Alawite areas, as the regime sought to rid itself of its former ultra secularist, anti-religious image. The Syrian mass media diligently presented Asad to the Syrian public and the world at large as a bona-fide Muslim. Bashar like Kafirs before him, made a deliberate effort to portray himself not only as a Muslim but as a devout one. Furthermore, since the 1990's religious schools have opened all over the country. Religious literature was readily available, and was sold to the general public in far greater quantities than books on other subjects. The number of students studying Sharia in the university was constantly on the rise, and popular religious programs just like in other Arab countries were broadcast on national television. Syrian society, especially its Sunni components, was becoming more observant. At least if judged for example, by participation in prayer or the adoption of the Islamic dress code. But all of the above failed to overcome the sectarian fault lines. Many in the Sunni majority community continued to regard the Alawis as socially inferior heretics whose political dominance was unbearable. And when the Arab Spring erupted in Syria, it did not take long for it to develop into an all out sectarian civil war. Even in Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, the regime went through an Islamizing phase. Shiite opposition to the essentially Sunni regime was always ruthlessly suppressed. After Saddam Hussein's final rise to power in 1979, along with his effort to forge an Iraqi sense of national consciousness drawing on Iraq's supposed pre-Islamic Babylonian past, Saddam was not averse to exploiting political Islam when he felt that such a shift might better serve his purpose. Thus, while cracking down on Shiite political movements, outlawing the Shiite opposition party Aldawa, and arresting and executing Shi'ite leaders, the regime changed gears in its political language. Saddam even began to claim direct descent from Ali bin Abi Talib, revered by the Shi'ites as the rightful successor to the prophet. The employment of Islamic themes for regime legitimization increased consistently, from a toeing of the Islamic line, for most of the war with Iran in 1980s, to deliberate Islamic flag waving in the 1990s. During the war with Shiite Iran, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Shiites fought shoulder to shoulder with their Sunni compatriots, partly out of loyalty to the state of Iraq and to their own Iraqiness, partly out of intimidation by the state's ruthless organs of suppression. The war, however, also made it increasingly clear to the regime just how effectively the Iranians had made religion into a mobilizing force, as opposed to the weakness of Marthy ideology in emotionally mate, motivating Iraqis. This further encouraged the process of Islamization, which peaked on the eve of the Gulf War in early 1991, when the words Allahu Akbar were embroidered on the Iraqi flag. But these efforts were obviously artificial and got nowhere in bridging the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shiites, in Iraq. After Saddam's overthrow by the US in 2003, as we have already seen, the country rapidly degenerated into sectarian strife, between Sunnis and Shiites, which has yet to come to an end, over a decade later
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